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ERASING RACE FROM LEGAL EDUCATION 
Judith G. Greenberg* 
In this Article, Professor Greenberg argues that law schools claim 
to treat African American students as iftheir race is irrelevant, yet 
law school curricula have a hidden message that African American 
students are in fact inferior and dangerous to white students. When 
African American students do not perform as well as white stu-
dents, they are assumed to have deficient skills and are placed in 
remedial programs to improve those skills. Professor Greenberg 
argues that the cause of African American students' poor perfor-
mance in law school is not necessarily deficient skills, but rather 
a bias inherent in the structure of legal education that rewards 
cultural traits that do not match those often identified with African 
American culture. Thus, despite their claims to be color-blind, law 
schools provide inherent preferences for students who can act, 
think, and write white. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is no secret that African American 1 law students tend to 
do less well academically than their white counterparts. Many 
attribute this discrepancy to a lack of skills. Law schools often 
seek to remedy the situation through academic support pro-
grams which, in turn, result in only marginal success. Despite 
their lack of efficacy, academic support programs are popular 
with the faculty and administrations of predominantly white 
* Professor of Law, New England School of Law. B.A. 1969, Cornell University; 
J.D. 1972, University of Wisconsin Law School; LL.M. 1979, Harvard Law School. I 
would like to thank Leslie Espinoza, Ken Greenberg, Duncan Kennedy, Dorothy 
Roberts, Elizabeth Spahn, and Robert Ward for their help on this Article. This Article 
is dedicated to the memory of my late colleague, Mary Joe Frug, who was my ally, 
intellectual mentor, and friend. I miss her tremendously. 
1. A note on usage is appropriate here. I am using the term" African American" 
to refer to those Americans whose identities derive, in part, from the forced importa-
tion and enslavement of Africans in the United States. I am specifically using this 
term "African American" because it leaves room for the separate recognition of dark 
skinned Americans with other cultural backgrounds, including recent immigrants from 
the West Indies or Haiti. Cf Adrien K. Wing, Brief Reflections Toward a Multiplicative 
Theory and Praxis of Being, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 181, 181 n.3 (1990-1991) 
(identifying herself as "Black" because she believes it is a more inclusive term than 
"African American"). For a general discussion of how a particular minority group's 
history and culture affects its relationship to education, see JOHN U. OGBU, MINORITY 
EDUCATION AND CASTE: THE AMERICAN SYsTEM IN CRoss-CuLTURAL PERSPECTIVE (1978). 
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law schools. If these programs are only marginally successful, 
why are they so popular? This Article suggests new ways to 
answer this question. 
African American law students' comparatively poor perfor-
mances in law school are not surprising. This poor performance 
was noted as early as the 1960s.3 Whether we measure aca-
demic success in terms of attrition rates, ranking within the 
class, or bar pass rates, African American law students perform 
dramatically worse than white law students. The attrition rate 
for minority law students in the 1970s exceeded the attrition 
rate for all law students by fifty to one hundred percent.4 A 
study by the Law School Admission Council (LSAC) in 1986 
showed that the situation for African American law students 
had not improved much over the intervening ten years: their 
attrition rate was twenty-five percent while the rate for non-
minority students was only fourteen percent.5 
2. Although the historically African American law schools also have academic 
support programs, see Paul L. Diggs, Communication Skills in Legal Materials: The 
Howard Law School Program, 1970 U. TOL. L. REV. 763, their programs are set in a 
radically different social context and may have very different meanings than similar 
programs at other law schools. This Article is addressed to the education of African 
American students at predominantly white law schools. 
3. See, e.g.' LAW SCH. ADMISSION TEST COUNCIL, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION TEST: 
ANNUAL COUNCIL REPORT 155 (1969) (finding that polled schools' major attempts to 
provide special tutorial programs were uniformly unsatisfactory); Ernest Gellhorn, 
The Law Schools and the Negro, 1968 DUKE L.J. 1069, 1083 (describing low success 
levels of African Americans in Emory's pre-law school summer programs). 
4. Portia Y.T. Hamlar, Minority Tokenism in American Law Schools, 26 How. 
L.J. 443, 532 (1983). Much of the literature in this area discusses minority students 
in general without focusing on African American students specifically. I use this 
literature, but I indicate when it discusses all minority students instead of only 
African American students. This literature is helpful because what is true of minority 
students in general is probably true of African American students in particular. 
5. Developments: Minority Attrition in Law School, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 144, 145 
(1987). Data on class rank and bar pass rates also illustrate the difficulties that 
African American law students are having with law school. One study of students from 
two _large California state law schools showed that over 75% of the African American 
students who applied for admission to the California bar were in the bottom quarter 
of their classes. Stephen P. Klein, Disparities in Bar Exam Passing Rates Among 
Racial I Ethnic Groups: Their Size, Source, and Implications, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 
517, 525 (1991). On average, these students ranked in the bottom 15% of their law 
school classes. Id. Similarly, bar pass rates for African American law students have 
been comparatively low. Oregon and Florida report that African American applicants 
pass the bar examination at approximately two-thirds the rate of white applicants, 
while in California and Colorado their pass rate is about half that of white applicants. 
Dannye Holley & Thomas Kleven, The Bar Examination and Other Barriers to African 
and Hispanic American Fair Representation among American Lawyers: A 1990 
Update-Perspectives and Recommendations, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 477, 488-90 
(1991) (listing bar exam pass rates for California, Oregon, and Colorado from 1985 
to 1990); Ken Meyers, Studies Suggest That Minorities Still Lag in Admissions, Tests, 
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Law schools, for their part, have tried to remedy the problem 
through a variety of academic support programs which focus 
on improving African American students' analytical, writing, 
and doctrinal skills.6 These programs have had some limited 
success in reducing African American students' attrition rates 
in law school, but those rates· remain disproportionately high. 7 
For example, approximately twenty percent of those who 
participated in the early days of the pre-law school program 
run by the Council on Legal Education Opportunity (CLEO), 
a well-known and long-established program, left law school 
without completing their degrees.8 Over a three year span in 
the Mellon program at the University of Pittsburgh Law 
School, approximately thirteen percent of the African American 
first year students were unable to advance to the second year.9 
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24, 1992, at 4 (discussing a study which showed that 76% of whites 
but only 46% of Blacks passed the Florida bar examination); see also Daniel 0. 
Bernstine, Minority Law Students and the Bar Examination: Are Law Schools Doing 
Enough?, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1989, at 10 (describing low bar passage rates of minority 
graduates of three of the "better" law schools). These dismal statistics have prompted 
several state bars and the LSAC to conduct studies to attempt to ascertain the cause. 
See, e.g., MAsSACHUSETl'S BARAss'N CoMM. ON BAR ADMISSIONS, THE BAR EXAMINATION: 
Is IT FAIR? (describing concerns about minority law school graduates' low bar pass 
rates and making recommendations to improve those rates); Henry Ramsey, Jr., Law 
Graduates, Law Schools and Bar Passage Rates, B. EXAMINER, Feb. 1991, at 21 
(describing a LSAC bar passage study). The disparities in bar passage rates, however, 
may be less severe than they appear if large percentages of African Americans who 
initially fail the bar exam pass it on subsequent attempts. See id. at 26 (noting that 
the bar passage study would provide data on this phenomenon at a national level). 
6. See infra Part III. 
7. Assessments of the success of academic support programs are difficult, 
however, because control groups rarely are available. Paul T. Wangerin, Law School 
Academic Support Programs, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 771, 776 (1989) (decrying the method-
ological and interpretive problems of evaluating academic support programs). 
8. Hamlar, supra note 4, at 543; Ralph R. Smith, The CLEO Experience: A 
Success by Any Measure, 22 How. L.J. 399, 400 (1979). These figures should not be 
taken as a criticism of CLEO in particular. Almost 45% of those who participate in 
CLEO ultimately do graduate from law school, a significant accomplishment given 
that without CLEO many of these students would never have been admitted to law 
school in the first place. Hamlar, supra note 4, at 543; see also Leo M. Romero, An 
Assessment of Affirmative Action in Law School Admissions after Fifteen Years: A Need 
for Recommitment, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 430, 434-35 (1984) (noting that over 70% of 
CLEO graduates who were admitted to law school completed it successfully). 
9. Kevin Deasy, Enabling Black Students to Realize Their Potential in Law 
School: A Psycho-Social Assessment of an Academic Support Program, 16 T. MARsHALL 
L. REV. 547, 558 (1991); see also Daniel 0. Bernstine, An Empirical Study of the 
University of Wisconsin Law School Special Admissions Program: A Progress Report, 
7 BLACK L.J. 146, 151 n.20 (1981) (reporting that the Legal Education Opportunities 
Program at the University of Wisconsin Law School, which enrolled primarily African 
American students, was able to assist 78% of participating students to pass their first 
year); Graham Hughes et al., The Disadvantaged Student and Preparation for Legal 
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In general, despite the fact that at least 109 American Bar 
Association accredited law schools reported having some type 
of academic support program, 10 attrition rates for minority 
students from 1981 to 1988 ranged from a high of 30.2% in 
1985 to a low of 24. 7% in 1986, with a rate of 26.9% in 1988. 11 
In contrast, attrition rates for majority students during the 
same period ranged from 10.8% to 13.4%, with a rate of 11.3% 
in 1988.12 
Furthermore, even if programs have successfully reduced 
attrition levels, 13 they have not had much success in moving 
African American students' grade point averages (GPAs) to a 
distribution that resembles that of the majority students. For 
example, at the University of Oregon Law School almost three-
quarters of the students who participated in the Academic Sup-
port Program from 1984 to 1987 had GPAs in the bottom half 
of their first year class.14 Similarly, in the Mellon program over 
a three year period, only eighteen percent of the African 
American students achieved grade averages of"B-" or better.15 
The result is that, although African American law students 
may not be flunking out of school at the extraordinarily high 
rates that existed prior to the institution of support programs, 
their GPAs remain unacceptably low. 
The various efforts to provide academic support to African 
American students do not appear to have generated solutions 
to their low GP As. Perhaps this absence of significant success 
Education: The New York University Experience, 1970 U. TOL. L. REV. 701, 713 (noting 
that despite the tutorial program arranged for African American students, 12 out of 
14 involved had below "C" averages); Allyson L. Moore, Minority Programs: Do They 
Pass?, N.J. L.J., July 19, 1990, at 1 (describing disproportionate bar exam failure rates 
for academic support program graduates, including African Americans, from New 
Jersey's three law schools). 
10. MINORITY .AFFAIRS COMM. OF THE LAW SCH. ADMISffiON COUNCIL, SUMMARY REPoRT 
ON THE ISAC QuFsnONNAIRE ON 8PEcIAL LAW ScHOOL PRooRAMS FOR MINORITY STuoENTS 
73, 97, 125 (1988) [hereinafter MINORITY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REPORT). 
11. Holley & Kleven, supra note 5, at 485. 
12. Id. 
13. For example, the Mellon Program at the University of Pittsburgh Law School 
reduced attrition rates of African American students from over 50% to approximately 
13%. Deasy, supra note 9, at 557-58. 
14. In the 1984-1985 school year, 71.5% of the academic support program 
students were in the bottom half of their first year class. In the 1985-1986 school 
year, 69.6% were so placed, and in the 1986-1987 school year, the percentage rose 
to 78.6%. Charles L. Finke, Affirmative Action in Law School Academic Support 
Programs, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 55, 67--69 (1989). The Oregon program served generally 
"disadvantaged" law students, not just African Americans. See id. at 61. The majority 
of participating students were minority students. See id. at 62 n.21. 
15. Deasy, supra note 9, at 558. 
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should be taken as an indication that our current under-
standing of the problem-that African American students lack 
skills-is incomplete. Thus, it is appropriate to revisit the 
question that has haunted legal educators for more than a 
decade: Why do African American law students perform so 
poorly in law school? 
This Article offers a different way of thinking about this 
question. Instead of focusing on the "deficiencies" of African 
American law students, I investigate the structure of legal 
education and its construction of those students. Part I briefly 
describes the social ideal of a color-blind legal system. This 
ideal is premised on the assertion that race is irrelevant to 
individual identity. Since legal education does not exist in a 
vacuum, this norm can be expected to have a significant effect 
on the treatment of racial issues within law school. 
Part II turns to the law school context and examines the 
claim of color blindness in this setting. The curriculum, the 
teaching materials, and the common pedagogical techniques all 
are structured around a norm of whiteness that is rendered 
color-blind by the unstated assumption that African American 
students are fundamentally the same as white students. Race 
is addressed only through widespread silence. Deeply sub-
merged and in opposition to this assertion of color blindness 
is the hidden message of the curriculum, materials, and 
techniques that African American students are inferior and 
dangerous to the white students. These two messages exist 
simultaneously in the curriculum, in tension with each other. 
Part III looks at two issues that overtly raise the question 
of race: affirmative action and academic support programs. 
This Part explores the two distinct discourses of these pro-
grams. One discourse primarily denies differences, but, to the 
extent that differences are perceived, it redefines them as 
superficial and remediable deficiencies. As with the legal 
system in general, the counterpoint is a second discourse in 
which the differences are recognized, found to demonstrate 
inferiority in the particular context, and claimed to be dan-
gerous to the white students. 16 
Part IV argues that some African American law students 
may perceive themselves as different from white students in 
16. Cf. Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood, and the Difference I Deviance 
Divide, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 877 (1992) (exploring the distinction between deviance 
and difference in the context of the Black female community). 
56 UniveT'Sity of MU:higan Journal of Law &form [VOL. 28:1 
ways that are fundamental and not superficial. Drawing on 
postmodern cultural and linguistic criticism, this Part describes 
the roles that African American communities, a distinct oral 
linguistic tradition, and an oppositional stance toward white 
culture play in the development of some African Americans' 
identities. For students who understand themselves in this 
way, law school may require not just new skills, but a new self. 
My claim in this Article is that African American students' 
relatively poor performance need not be attributed to the 
students' deficient skills, as traditionally has been the case. In-
stead, that poor performance reflects a bias inherent in the 
structure oflegal education that rewards cultural traits which 
do not match those of African American culture.17 In particular, 
oral skills often are identified as especially well-developed and 
appreciated within African American communities. Yet, legal 
education rewards excellence in writing over excellence in oral 
performance, even though oral skills are clearly relevant to a 
lawyer's effectiveness. 
Thus, my goal is not to propose new programs that could 
supplement the current structure of legal equcation and 
therefore improve African American students' performances. 
Rather, it is to suggest that under the current structure, 
students whose identities are culturally African American 
. necessarily will experience considerably more difficulty in law 
school than students whose identities are more consistent with 
the dominant white culture. In other words, law school, despite 
its claims to be color-blind, is not culturally neutral; it provides 
inherent preferences for students who can act, think, and write 
white. 
I. COLOR-BLIND IDEOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
One way to answer the persistent question about why 
African American law students perform less well than their 
white counterparts is to consider the context within which legal 
education occurs. The legal system, in general, claims to be 
17. I am not claiming that all African Americans share a single culture or that 
all African Americans share the traits that I describe. I only claim that these are 
traits that many African Americans have identified as fundamental to their identities 
as African Americans. See infra Part IV. 
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color-blind18-a claim which supports mainstream American 
culture and practices.19 Exploring the law's assertion of color-
blindness provides a framework within which to discuss similar 
assertions of racial neutrality in the discourse of legal educa-
tion. 
The color-blind stance was stated almost a hundred years ago 
by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,20 in 
which he wrote: "Our Constitution is color-blind."21 Although 
he was unable to convince the Court to adopt his position in 
Plessy, his powerful metaphor resurfaced with the Civil Rights 
movement of the 1960s.22 By then, Andrew Kull reports, "some 
members of the Supreme Court appeared to regard the color 
blindness of the Constitution as a settled thing."23 This as-
sumption of color blindness is reflected in judicial statements 
such as: "[R]acial classifications are obviously irrelevant and 
invidious."24 
The ideology of color blindness asserts that decision making 
without attributing value to skin color is both desirable and 
practicable.25 According to color-blind ideology, race implies no 
more about an individual than does that person's hair or eye 
color, height, weight, or nose length. A person's "important" 
traits-such as intelligence, perseverance, and curiosity-are 
determined by who the person is, not by that person's race.26 
18. The blindfolded woman who symbolizes justice is an example of this-she 
supposedly does not see the particular characteristics of the claimants who stand 
before her. Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727, 
1758 (1987). These unseen characteristics include race. But see Neil Gotanda, A 
Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6 n.20 (1991) 
(arguing that, while a blind test may theoretically avoid noticing race, "in the real 
world very few judgments about people are made without a moment of racial 
identification"). 
19. Gotanda, supra note 18, at 2-3; Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE 
L.J. 758, 762. 
20. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
21. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
22. For a detailed history of claims that the Constitution should be interpreted 
as "color-blind," see ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992). 
23. Id. at 164. 
24. Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 687 (1963); see KULL, supra note 22, at 
164. 
25. Gotanda, supra note 18, at 16; see also Kimber le W. Crenshaw & Gary Peller, 
Reel Time I Real Justice, in READING RoDNEY KING/READING URBAN UPRISING 56, 60 
(Robert Gooding-Williams ed., 1993) (maintaining that the "embrace of 'color 
blindness' as the norm of equal protection" in Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 
(1989), means that "racism consists of the failure to treat people on an individual basis 
according to terms that are neutral to race"). 
26. See T. Alexander AleinikoH: A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
1060, 106~ (1991) (explaining that race is an "arbitrary factor," and that "to categorize 
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Advocates of a color-blind approach to decision making argue 
that "to treat race ... as a proxy criterion for a particular 
viewpoint or perspective [or set of abilities] is to engage in 
illegitimate stereotyping-racism ... -of the most pernicious 
form."27 This argument is based on the belief that "[p]eople are 
not intellectual captives of their skin color."28 
According to this understanding of the world, individuals 
stand alone. Who they are is not determined in any predictable 
way by their histories; their character traits and positions 
cannot be determined by consideration of the communities with 
which they affiliate. To think of individuals in terms of their 
communities would be to stereotype them in just the manner 
that color-blind decision making is intended to prevent. 29 Thus, 
decisions about public policy must be race neutral. 
A color-blind stance claims not only that race is irrelevant 
to decisions about people, but that individuals' own life choices 
are unaffected by their race. As Dwight Greene illustrated in 
his discussion of Florida v. Bostwick,30 the Court analyzes cases 
on the assumption that race does not affect how people act. 31 
Bostick involved a request by Florida police to search an 
African American bus passenger's luggage for drugs. The police 
on the basis of race is to miss the individual"); Gotanda, supra note 18, at 40 
(describing "formal-race"). 
27. Michael S. Paulsen, Reverse Discrimination and Law School Faculty Hiring: 
The Undiscovered Opinion, 71 TEX. L. REV. 993, 1000 (1993); but see STEPHEN L. 
CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 29--34 (1991) (arguing that racial 
stereotyping is now considered in vogue and progressive). 
28. Paulsen, supra note 27, at 1000. 
29. In 1964, Louis Lusky wrote that a stereotype is: 
[A] conception of a group of people as possessing, each of them, certain charac-
teristics that are believed to inhere in the group; a conception that is factually 
erroneous; and a conception that is impervious to rational refutation because 
it is rooted in the emotions rather than the intellect . 
. . . The stereotype ... involves a sort of hysterical paralysis . . . . 
Louis Lusky, The Stereotype: Hard Core of Racism, 13 BUFF. L. REV. 450, 450-51 
(1964). He continued by noting that the important point about stereotypes is that "any 
stereotype results in a partial blindness to the actual qualities of individuals, and 
consequently is a persistent and prolific breeding ground for irrational treatment of 
them." Id. at 451. 
30. 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
31. Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, 
and the Myth of Colorless Individualism in Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1979, 
2022-43 (1993); see also Gotanda, supra note 18, at 36-52 (arguing that the Court 
typically approaches race as a formal classification that is unconnected to historical 
and social background). 
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admitted that they did not have any "articulable suspicion" for 
choosing to search this particular passenger's luggage.32 The 
legality of the search, and the admissibility of the cocaine that 
was found in the luggage, turned on whether the passenger 
had given consent voluntarily.33 Greene pointed out that the 
Court's opinion never mentioned that the defendant was an 
African American.34 This color-blind Court wrote as if the 
history of police relations with African American communities 
in America's urban areas was irrelevant to an African Ameri-
can bus passenger in south Florida faced with a request from 
the sheriffs department officers to search his luggage.35 
Once race is rejected as an irrelevant and irrational basis for 
decision making, something else must be substituted. For many 
who subscribe to color-blind decision making, this other 
criterion is merit.36 Merit can be defined as the ability to per-
form a particular task or the possession of qualities considered 
valuable.37 Ideas of merit are consistent with a focus on the 
individual instead of the group.38 
32. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431. 
33. Id. at 432. 
34. Greene, supra note 31, at 2028. 
35. For additional discussions of the relevance of African Americans' relations 
with the police to their reactions to the police, see CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ET AL., 
NAACP, BEYOND THE RoDNEY KING STORY: AN INvESTIGATION OF POLICE CONDUCT IN 
MINORITY COMMUNITIES (1995); David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be 
Contained?, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 488-90 (1992); Robert V. Ward, Con-
senting to a Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority Neighborhoods: No Place for a 
"Reasonable Person", 36 How. L.J. 239, 248-53 (1993). See generally NATIONAL ADVISORY 
CoMM'N ON ClvIL DISORDERS, REPoRT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMMMISSION ON ClvIL 
DISORDERS 157-68 (1968) (describing the causes of ghetto inhabitants' hostility toward 
the police and proposing reforms to help alleviate that hostility). 
36. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action 
in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705 (refuting the idea that decisions based on 
merit are color-blind by arguing that judgments of merit are not culturally neutral). 
37. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., To Each According to His Ability, From None According 
to His Race: The Concept of Merit in the Law of Antidiscrimination, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
815, 826-27 (1980); see also Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 446 F. Supp. 979, 
1014 n.87 (E.D. Mich. 1978) ("[l]f 'affirmative action' is a term mandating equality 
ofresult then this country is not far from rejection of the concepts of individual merit 
and achievement .... ");Stephen L. Carter,Academic Tenure and "White Male" Stan-
dards: Some Lessons from the Patent Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2065, 2068 (1991) (arguing 
that the merit of scholarship should be evaluated objectively in terms of its overall 
contribution to human knowledge, regardless of the scholar's perspective or subject 
matter); Kennedy, supra note 36, at 709-10 (noting that one of the "tenets of 
colorblindness" is that "[m]erit is a matter of individual traits or products," not group-
based status). 
38. Fallon, supra note 37, at 822. But note that race may sometimes be an accept-
able component of determining merit. For example, in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Justice Powell wrote that an acceptable kind of racial 
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The combination of merit-based standards and ideas of 
individual autonomy also permits an understanding of choice 
that places the decision not to be meritorious squarely on the 
individual instead of on society or the social structure. For 
example, in EEOC v. Sears,39 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Sears' failure to 
employ women as salespeople for items sold at a large commis-
sion did not violate Title VII because Sears produced survey 
evidence indicating that women chose less competitive and less 
demanding positions.40 
Thus, three tenets of the ideology of color blindness are 
particularly relevant to this discussion. First, decisions about 
the structure of society should be made without reference to 
the race of the people affected. Second, individuals' decisions 
are made independently of race. Finally, it is possible to create 
race-neutral criteria for determining who should receive 
rewards and who should not. 
Each of these tenets can be illustrated by analyzing the 
Supreme Court's decision in City of Richmond v. Croson.41 In 
Croson, the Court held unconstitutional an ordinance that 
required contractors who were awarded city construction 
contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the work to 
qualifying minority businesses.42 The Court rejected the 
appellant's claim that the ordinance could be justified as 
remedying injuries caused by past racial discrimination.43 
preference in an admissions program is one that "treats each applicant as an 
individual in the admissions process." Id. at 318. Despite the fact that race is often 
considered a group characteristic, Justice Powell specifically referred to the impor-
tance of treating each applicant as an individual in order to fit race within the 
framework of merit. Id. In contrast, the Supreme Court found racial quotas to be 
unconstitutional because they insulated individuals from comparison with other 
individuals. Id. at 320. 
39. 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). 
40. Id. at 329-30. In Sears, the court treated the women's choices as if they were 
not influenced by social and economic structuring of gender roles or by gender's 
structuring of the family and work roles. For a discussion of the court's conception 
of choice in Sears, see MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 12-18 (1992); Joan 
W. Scott, Deconstructing Equality-versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructural 
Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 33, 38-45 (1988); Vicki Shultz, Telling Stories 
about Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace 
in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 
1752-54 (1990). In similar ways, African Americans' choices often are portrayed as 
if they are not influenced by the context of race in American society. See infra text 
accompanying notes 51-59. 
41. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
42. Id. at 511. 
43. Id. at 498-99. 
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According to the Court, the identification of such injuries would 
be '.'sheer speculation" based on "statistical generalizations" 
that were not "tied to any injury suffered by anyone."44 In other 
words, the Court found the ordinance unconstitutional because, 
in the absence of findings of actual injury suffered by African 
Americans in the construction industry, "there [was] a danger 
that ·a racial classification [was] merely the product of un-
thinking stereotypes or a form ofracial politics."45 This was not 
an acceptable basis for making social decisions. The city, 
therefore, was unable to demonstrate the compelling interest 
necessary to uphold a racially based set-aside program.46 
The Court's decision relied on its determination that the 
traditional bidding process had provided a neutral means of 
allocating the public contracting opportunities. Although the 
bidding process itself was not challenged, the Court noted 
repeatedly that there was no evidence of prior discrimination 
in the Richmond construction industry.47 As a result, the new 
bidding process, with its requirement of awarding a percentage 
of bids to minority contractors, could be seen as a race-based 
mechanism for awarding contracts. 
Also consistent with the tenets of color-blind ideology, the 
Court in Croson did not believe that the selection of bids and 
the ability to bid were affected by the bidder's race.48 In fact, 
the Court relied on testimony indicating an absence of racial 
discrimination. For example, at the public hearing at which the 
ordinance was originally heard, one witness noted that minori-
ty contractors, if available to bid, would have the same oppor-
tunities to do so as anyone else.49 The Court also noted that 
representatives of the local contractors' organizations indicated 
that they did not discriminate on the basis of race and were in 
. fact actively seeking minority members.50 Thus, the Court 
assumed, based on this testimony, that no minority contractor's 
decision on whether to bid on a particular project should have 
been affected by her race. 
44. Id. at 499. 
45. Id. at 510. 
46. Id. at 505. 
47. Id. at 500, 503, 505. 
48. Id. at 480 ("There was no direct evidence of race discrimination on the part 
of the city in letting contracts or any evidence that the city's prime contractors had 
discriminated against minority-owned subcontractors."). 
49. Id. (citing Councilperson Kemp). 
50. Id. at 481. 
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In its description of the minority subcontractors' choices, the 
Court missed the same type of evidence of how race affects 
individual choices that it missed in Bostick. 51 The opinion in 
Croson describes circumstances which in effect limited the 
minority subcontractor's opportunities to bid on the construc-
tion project. There were only two manufacturers whose 
products met the bid specifications. 52 In its effort to prepare a 
bid, the minority subcontractor, Continental, contacted two 
suppliers of the approved products.53 The first already had 
submitted a quotation directly to the general contractor, 
Croson, and refused to provide a quote to Continental, while 
the second was not familiar with Continental and therefore 
required. thirty days to complete a credit check.54 Finally, 
Continental contacted an agent of the second approved manu-
facturer.55 The quotation that this agent made to Continental 
was not only "subject to credit approval," but was also "sub-
stantially higher than any other quotation Croson had 
received."56 Croson, instead of asking the city to keep the bids 
open long enough to allow the credit check to be completed, and 
instead of asking the first manufacturer to deal with Continen-
tal, requested that the city waive the set-aside requirement.57 
The Court did not see Continental's difficulties in partici-
pating in the bidding process as deficiencies in the supposedly 
neutral bidding process's ability to identify meritorious con-
tractors. Rather, it treated them as deficiencies in Continental. 
Just as it understood the women in Sears as "choosing" not to 
seek major commission sales jobs, and just as it understood the 
African American defendant in Bostick as freely choosing to 
cooperate with the police in the aisle of the bus, the Court's 
emphasis on past discrimination implies that Continental's 
difficulties are not attributable to current discrimination in the 
bidding process but to Continental's poor choices. The Court's 
51. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). For a discussion of Bostick, see supra 
notes 30-35 and accompanying text. 
52. Croson, 488 U.S. at 481. 
53. Id. at 482. 
54. Id. It is entirely possible that the first agent's refusal to deal with Continental 
and the second agent's credit requirement were related to Continental's minority 
status. The Court never considers this possibility. Minority-owned businesses in 
Richmond rarely belonged to local trade associations. Id. at 529 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 483. 
57. Id. at 482. 
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language in discussing Continental's inability to submit a bid 
before the date when the waiver request was submitted is 
significant: "By October 19, 1983, Croson had still not received 
a bid from Continental."58 The use of the word "still" implies 
that the Court believed that Continental should have submit-
ted its bid earlier, despite the fact that it had been told less 
than a week before that a credit check would take thirty days, 
and despite the fact that Continental had promptly informed 
Croson of the credit problems. The Court did not consider 
whether Croson could have waited to submit the waiver 
request until after the credit check was completed.59 
Failure to consider the facts leading up to Continental's late 
bid allowed the Court to act as if Continental was able to do 
business in the same way as majority businesses, unhampered 
by subtle, unconscious forms of racial discrimination.60 The 
Court also implied that it was somehow Continental's fault 
that its bid could not come in on time; perhaps Continental was 
an inefficient, poorly run, or otherwise undeserving business. 
Thus, the Court treated Continental as if it had chosen not to 
perform adequately. In short, reliance on so-called objective 
measures allowed the Court to ignore both the social context 
in which decisions about bidding are made and the effect that 
race has on individual choices and options. 
In Croson, the Court assumed that Croson merited the award 
because of its bid and that Continental did not because Conti-
nental chose to bid late. Claims of merit-based decisions and 
of individual choice allow Americans to believe that race is 
irrelevant to decisions in modern America. Despite this belief, 
race matters.61 This should be clear to anyone who reads 
stories of police or security guard conduct,62 anyone who has 
58. Id. 
59. AB it turned out, Croson's request for a waiver was denied on November 2 and 
sometime after December 9 the city informed Croson that it had decided to rebid the 
project. Id. at 483. The results of the credit check should have been in long before 
that, so Croson might not have needed to move so rapidly in asking for a waiver. 
60. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (describing uncon-
scious racism and arguing that it should be considered in applying and interpreting 
the Equal Protection clause). 
61. This phrase is the title ofComel West's new book, CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 
(1993). For a similar use of the phrase, see RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE 
MATTERS (1993) (describing the ways in which the experience of being white is 
constructed by race). 
62. See, e.g., Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Notes from California: Rodney King and the 
Race Question, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 199, 201-06 (1993). Culp, an African American 
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ever pressed a doorbell for entrance into an urban boutique,63 
or anyone who has ever looked at pornography64-to name just 
a few of the areas in which race matters. 
In addition, because actions that are prohibited in the public 
sphere often are protected in the private sphere, the pub-
lic/private dichotomy functions to permit the continuance of 
differential and inferior treatment of African Americans. An 
individual's social decisions are understood as private and 
therefore not subject to an investigation as to whether they are 
racially motivated.65 This allows whites to exclude African 
Americans from their private lives. It also allows the courts to 
accept the "choices" that African Americans make--choices like 
permitting police to open baggage on a bus or to run a business 
inefficiently-as if they were made freely and were unaffected 
professor at Duke Law School, described being stopped and questioned by traffic police 
after having retrieved something from his office late at night: 
As I turned near the law school I noticed that a campus police car was following 
me. This police car sped up and followed as closely as it could as I approached 
the next light. . . . [T]he policeman turned on his overhead police lights and 
pulled me over .... I asked him why he had pulled me over, and I showed him 
my driver's license. He stopped me, he said, because I had crossed the double 
lines at the intersection. I pointed out to him that that argument was just silly 
because the nature of the interchange made it virtually impossible to cross the 
yellow: lines. He glanced at my driver's license and simply got back into his car 
and drove off. I never knew if he noticed that my driver's license lists me as a 
white male which, despite what his eyes told him, may have immunized me, or 
whether-as I have always contended-the campus police are required to 
remember the faces of all 35 black faculty members. I have no doubt, however, 
why I was stopped. It was the interaction of the color of my skin, my apparent 
age ... and my gender .... 
Id. at 203; see also OGLETREE ET AL., supra note 35 (describing the influence ofrace on 
policing); Deborah W. Post, Race, Riots and the Rule of Law, 70 DENY. U. L. REV. 237, 
257-59 (1993) (describing being shadowed by a security guard while shepherding her 
black son and young cousins through a museum). 
63. See PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALcHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 44-40 (1991) (describ-
ing her experience of being denied access to Benetton by a white employee even 
though other (white) customers were in the store). 
64. See PATRICIA HILL CoLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT 167-73 (1991) (describing 
the representation of Black women in pornography); ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY 
215-17 (1981) (same). 
65. Gotanda, supra note 18, at 8-12. For critiques of the coherence of the 
public/private distinction, see Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the 
Public I Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982); Karl E. Klare, The 
Public I Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358 (1982); see also 
Robert H. Mnookin, The Public I Private Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and 
Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429 (1982) (discussing the arguments for 
and against the recognition of a "private sphere" not subject to government regulation 
and the possible dimensions of that sphere). 
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by race. Since these choices are understood as freely made, 
they function to legitimate African Americans' subordinate 
positions in society. According to the ideology of color blind-
ness, African Americans chose these inferior positions. 
Characterizing African American subordination as a product 
of choice, as in cases like Bostick and Croson, is not the only 
way in which legal doctrine perpetuates that subordination. 
Kimberle Crenshaw's study of race discrimination law de-
scribes the ways in which racial subordination remains despite 
the existence of civil rights laws.66 She notes that the stereo-
typed characteristics once attributed to African Americans as 
a result of biology are now ascribed to culture.67 Furthermore, 
the presence of "white" traits like ii:idustriousness and intelli-
gence are understood to account for white success.68 In order 
for civil rights laws to create true equality of whites and 
African Americans, whites would have to "confront myths about 
equality of opportunity that justify for them whatever measure 
of economic success they may have attained. "69 
Legal doctrine also perpetuates subordination through the 
way in which the courts have interpreted the First Amend-
ment. 7° Charles Lawrence argues that the First Amendment 
has been interpreted to protect certain constitutional values 
but not others, thereby reinforcing the subordination of racial 
minorities.71 Although the First Amendment's exception for 
"fighting words" usually is interpreted as excluding racial 
insults, Lawrence shows that racial insults have the same 
emotional impact as fighting words and the same "preemptive 
nature"-they are unanswerable.72 Unlike racial epithets, 
however, the danger of "fighting words" to the public peace is 
66. Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation inAntidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); see also Alan 
D. Freedman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: 
A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978) (tracing 
the history of Supreme Court decisions in the area of racial discrimination and 
discussing the reasons for their failure to alleviate that discrimination); Mari J. 
Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for 
the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991) (analyzing the ways in which 
distinguishing nonconforming accents allows employers to discriminate without 
sanction). 
67. Crenshaw, supra note 66, at 1379. 
68. Id. at 1373. 
69. Id. at 1381. , 
70. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
71. Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech 
on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431. 
72. Id. at 452-53. 
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easily understood from a white male perspective. 73 In contrast, 
regulation of racial hate speech is seen as an incursion on the 
protections accorded by the First Amendment to all Ameri-
cans. 74 Hate speech and its subordinating message are thereby 
protected as speech. The fact that people of color must pay a 
particular and unique price for protecting free speech is over-
looked. 75 
The Supreme Court also perpetuates the subordination of 
African Americans by its language, which Neil Gotanda argues 
reinforces ideas of white supremacy. 76 He looks at cases dealing 
with voting rights, affirmative action, and jury selection and 
finds that the Court often considers race to be a characteristic 
unconnected to a social context or a particular history.77 Thus, 
decision making based on race is irrational and racism becomes 
an irrational prejudice.78 As a result, the types ofremedies that 
plausibly can combat racial subordination are limited.79 
Gotanda concludes: 
This disaggregated treatment [ofrace] veils the continuing 
oppression of institutional racism. It whittles racism down 
to the point where racism can be understood as an attitude 
problem amenable to formal-race solutions. . . . [This] 
hinders this country's ability to address the clear correla-
tion between racial minority populations and the concen-
trations of these various, supposedly distinct problems. 
Even if one admits that large numbers of the unemployed 
and undereducated youth in the inner cities are Black, 
unconnectedness hinders the government's ability to use 
that correlation as a basis for attacking social ills. 80 
Law becomes part of the system that supports racial subordi-
nation instead of being part of the cure. 
Thus, the ideology of color blindness declares both the 
irrelevance of race and the inferiority of African Americans. 
Overtly, it asserts that African Americans should be treated 
73. Id. at 454. 
74. Id. at 473-75. 
75. Id. at 4 75. 
76. See Gotanda, supra note 18. 
77. Id. at 40-42. 
78. Id. at 43-44. 
79. Id. at 44. 
80. Id. at 45. 
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the same as whites. Covertly, however, it continues to accept 
doctrines like those allowing private racism and thereby 
permits the subordination of African Americans. It is in this 
context that we must consider the construction of African 
American law students' identities in legal education. 
II. THE DISCOURSES OF LEGAL EDUCATION: 
CURRICULUM AND PEDAGOGY 
A. Claims of Color Blindness 
Like the larger legal culture, legal education also makes 
claims to color blindness. As with the legal system in general, 
these claims support and legitimate the status quo in legal 
education. These claims assert that it is not necessary to 
consider race in making policy decisions, such as curricular 
decisions, about the structure of legal education. They also 
assert that people's responses to that structure will not be 
affected by their race. This is a claim that legal education is 
race neutral. 
Most of the time, the claim to be color-blind is made through 
silence. Discussions of legal education rarely mention race as 
a factor relevant to a student's success. For example, Robert 
Granfield's recent study of the culture of law school, Making 
Elite Lawyers,81 does not treat race as an organizing principle, 
although it does include chapters on women and working-class 
students.82 The major liberal critiques of the 1970s that identi-
fied legal education as inhumane83 or impractical84 barely 
81. RoBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS (1992). Granfield does not omit 
African American law students entirely. He includes one quotation from an African 
American law student in making the point that while most law students enter law 
school for career reasons, some enter for altruistic reasons. Id. at 39. This, however, 
simply demonstrates my point that the race of the student is not important to 
Granfield. Rather, the student is quoted to prove a statement about all law students' 
motives in entering law school. Meaning is attributed to the student's intentions, but 
not to his race. In fact, Granfield does not include index entries for "Black" students, 
"African American" students, or "students of color.• See id. at 244-48. 
82. Id. at 94-122. 
83. See, e.g., Jack Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquiry into the 
Application of Humanistic Educational Psychology to the Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 514 (1978) (emphasizing the importance of individual and social development 
in the process of obtaining a legal education). 
84. See, e.g., Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Scenes From a Clinic, 127 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1 (1978) (contrasting the role of a clinic faculty advisor with that of a law 
school professor). 
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touched on issues of race. The more leftist-oriented critique by 
people associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement 
focused on the ways in which legal education worked to repro-
duce hierarchy in general,s5 but not, until recently, on racial 
hierarchies in particular.s6 Similarly, much of the important 
feminist legal literature of the late 1970s and early 1980s 
· ignored the significance of race. 87 
The message of color blindness also is implicit in many of the 
common practices of legal education. Law schools' goal of 
teaching each student to "think like a lawyer" resonates with 
color blindness, since skin color is not considered relevant in 
determining whether one is thinkinglike a lawyer. The phrase 
"thinking like a lawyer" has meant discovering the underlying 
scientific principles of the law-principles that are equally 
available to and supposedly have equal meaning for all stu-
dents, regardless of race.ss The result, as Kimberle Crenshaw 
notes, is that "when the discussion involves racial minorities, 
minority students are expected to stand apart from their 
history, their identity, and sometimes their own immediate 
circumstances and discuss issues without making reference to 
the reality that the 'they' or 'them' being discussed is from [the 
minority students'] perspective 'we' or 'us.' "89 
85. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierar· 
chy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591 (1982) (describing the hierarchies resulting from students' 
competitiveness in class, grading and ranking, career placement, and the professors' 
interests in preserving school rankings). 
86. Crenshaw, supra note 66, at 1356. . 
87. See, e.g., Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme 
Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913 (1983) (discussing the Supreme Court's application of the 
Equal Protection Clause and Title VII in the context of sex discrimination); Sylvia A. 
Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 963-66 (1984) 
(discussing the "analogies between race- and sex-based discrimination" and arguing 
that, although there are real sex-based differences in terms of reproductive capacity, 
"[t]here is no reason to believe that black and white people are inherently different 
in any way that should ever be allowed to matter in the law"); Wendy W. Williams, 
Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment I Special Treatment Debate, 13 
N. Y. U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984-1985)(highlighting the feminist debate over 
whether a woman's ability to reproduce demands special litigative attention to 
equalize the sexes in the workplace). 
88. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 41-43 (Mark DeWolfe Howey 
ed., 1963) (2d ed. 1881) (noting the impossibility of taking individual characteristics 
into account in determining if one is acting reasonably); Jerome M. Culp, Jr., 
Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal 
Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539, 546 (1991) (noting that the personal usually is consid-
ered irrelevant to law because "[!]aw has to treat rich and poor, pretty and ugly, black 
and white alike"); Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, Y Grenas: Un I Masking 
the Self While Uni Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 CHICANO-LATINO 
L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1994) (explaining the legal discourse assertion that there is only one 
relevant reality). 
89. Kimber!e W. Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in 
Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 3 (1989). 
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Consistent with the claim of color blindness, most law schools 
require students to identify themselves on their examinations 
by number instead of by name. Instead of interpreting the 
exam in light of the student's comments and positions in class, 
faculty are expected to grade according to objective, merit-
based standards commonly identified by the anagram "IRAC."90 
According to Paul Carrington, this practice of blind grading 
was instituted as a means of ensuring against favoritism for 
specially admitted minority students.91 Blind grading was seen 
as a way of guaranteeing that race did not impact on the 
meritocratic evaluative process. By holding the African Ameri-
can students to the same standards as the white students, 
legal education reiterated its claim of race blindness. 
As noted above,92 one of the central tenets of a color-blind 
approach to decision making is that race is an illegitimate 
criterion upon which to base a policy decision. In terms oflegal 
education, this means that African American students are not 
seen as differing from white students in the various traits that 
might matter such as intelligence, industriousness, and alacri-
ty. Law schools construe African American students to be the 
same as white students underneath their skin. They view their 
students' differences as superficial-the color of their skin.93 
90. Students are told to identify the issue, state the relevant rule(s), analyze the 
problem, and come to a conclusion. For discussions of law school exams, see Philip 
C. Kissam, Law School Eiaminations, 42 VAND. L. REV. 433 (1989); Janet Motley, A 
Foolish Consistency: The Law School Exam, 10 NOVA L.J. 723 (1986); Steven H. 
Nickles, Examining and Grading in American Law Schools, 30 ARK. L. REV. 411 
(1977); see also Norman Redlich & Steve Friedland, Challenging Tradition: Using 
Objectiue Questions in Law School Examinations, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 143 (1991) (recom-
mending the use of multiple choice examinations in lieu of or in addition to traditional 
essay exams). 
91. Paul D. Carrington, One Law: The Role of Legal Education in the Opening 
of the Legal Profession since 1776, 44 FLA. L. REV. 501, 565 (1992). 
·92. See supra Part I. 
93. Jerome M. Culp points out that there is a long history of assuming that 
"'Negroes are, after all, only white men with Black skins, nothing more, nothing 
less.'" Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Posner on Duncan Kennedy and Racial Difference: White 
Authority in the Legal Academy, 41 DUKE L.J. 1095, 1107 n.42 (1992)(quoting KENNETH 
M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION vii (1956)). One Georgetown law student 
expressed a similar sentiment when he said: "[E)very white male here thinks that if 
he was black or a woman or some other minority, they'd be at Harvard or Yale .... 
That's not true, but that's the impression." Saundra Torry, Racial Tension Scars 
Georgetown's Veneer, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1991, at Al, A9. The implication is that 
difference is only skin deep. The color-blind approach to race does not allow for the 
possibility that there may be cultural differences between African American and white 
law students and that these differences may be significant in the context of legal 
education. See infra Part IV. 
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The message of color blindness and the claim that African 
American students are ·the same as white students also is 
visible in the structure of the curriculum. The core of the 
curriculum in most law schools revolves around traditional 
common law subjects and statutory courses on corporate, 
commercial, and tax law. Race rarely is discussed in these 
courses. For example, a review of the indexes of three promi-
nent torts casebooks reveals that none of them contains an 
entry for "African American," "Black," "Negro," or "Race."94 
Although this does not necessarily mean that African Ameri-
cans are not mentioned at all in these casebooks, it does mean 
that the casebooks' editors did not consider the subject of 
African Americans to be one with sufficient relevance to a torts 
class that students might want to search for material according 
to that category. In fact, all three of these casebooks do make 
some references to race, for example, in their discussions of the 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 95 Even here, 
however, race is treated as an incidental, rather than an 
analyzing principle.96 
94. DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION (2d ed. 1993); MARC A. FRANKLIN & 
RoBERT L. RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES (5th ed. 1992); 
WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (8th ed. 1988). Dobbs does 
have an index entry under "Racial Discrimination," which sends the reader to 
"Discrimination," under which there are six sub-entries. One of these is "Ethnic 
indignities or racial slurs, mental distress." DOBBS, supra at 1075, 1062. 
95. DOBBS, supra note 94, at 58; FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 94, at 818-19; 
PROSSER ET AL., supra note 94, at 62. 
96. Prosser, Wade, and Schwartz, in their casebook, address race and intentional 
infliction of mental distress in a note following a case in which the plaintiff was 
particularly sensitive because of a speech impediment. PROSSER ET AL., supra note 94, 
at 57-60, 62. The implication is that, if one suffers mental distress due to racially 
discriminatory treatment, it is somehow similar to the mental distress suffered in the 
case of the plaintiff with the speech impediment. Although the commonalities and 
differences between racial discrimination and discrimination based on other charac-
teristics would make an interesting classroom discussion, Prosser, Wade, and 
Schwartz have buried the subject in a two and one-half page section of notes in which 
only two of the 28 cases involve race. Id. at 62. Furthermore, because the authors 
describe each of the cases relating to race only briefly, the editors encourage discus-
sion of the "plaintiffs sensitivity for race" in terms of the lead case (on the speech 
impediment) instead of in terms of race. They thereby imply that racial characteristics 
are not unique, bu·t rather are the same as other "superficial" differences like age, 
religion, pregnancy, and hypertension. 
Dobbs, in his casebook, also uses only the notes to treat racial discrimination as 
the subject of intentional infliction of emotional distress. DOBBS, supra note 94, at 56. 
In a series of questions, Dobbs covertly asks whether the power relationship between 
the plaintiff and the defendant might not be important to the tort. Id. at 58. Certainly, 
anyone focusing on this tort in a racial context would find this a relevant question. 
He asks the questions so discretely, however, that a student is likely to miss their 
importance unless the professor expressly refers to them in class. Dobbs's note asks: 
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Similarly, the required97 upperclass courses tend to treat race 
as if it were irrelevant to their subject matters. This is because 
race, in fact, has been made irrelevant to those courses as they 
are usually taught; most of the areas in those subjects that a 
significant number of African Americans might find interesting 
have been excised from the basic course. 98 
For example, corporations courses usually exclude issues 
relating to the availability of public funding for small busi-
nesses. The traditional course will cover private funding 
Id. 
What pattern is suggested by these cases? Can it be stated in a way broad 
enough to encompass LaBrier? Does the pattern here suggest that Mrs. LaBrier 
might have been liable if it had been she who made accusations? Or that Mr. 
Gomez might have been liable if his scatological vocabulary had been fired at 
Mr. Hug? 
Finally, Franklin and Rabin provide the longest treatment of racial insults of the 
three casebooks: over a page of textual notes, which include a note on the Civil Rights 
Acts and Title VII. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 94, at 818-20. They treat the issue, 
however, with as little affect as the other authors. Although they note that some 
courts have found causes of action for intentional infliction of mental distress but 
others have not, id. at 818-19, they fail to explain the differences in results. They do 
cite some important current scholarly work on the subject, but again they do not 
provide the student with any insight into what the works say. Id. at 819. 
Certainly none of these treatments would encourage a student interested in the 
relationship between race and law to believe that the tort of intentional infliction of 
mental distress, or tort law in general, had or could have much to say about that 
relationship. These casebook authors treat race as any other difference among 
individuals. In this way, they reinforce the idea that African Americans differ from 
whites in the same way that whites differ among themselves in hair color, height, or 
weight. Cf. Mark Tushnet, Spite Fences and Scholars: Why Race Is and Is Not 
Different, 26 CONN. L. REV. 285, 286-88 (1993) (arguing that racial discrimination is 
different from other forms of discrimination). 
97. By "required" I mean the courses that students tend to think of as required 
to pass the bar or to be literate in the law. I would include among these commercial 
law, corporate law, evidence, tax, and trusts and estates. Agreement as to exactly 
which courses fit this category is unnecessary because I contend that issues relating 
to race will not be a focus of discussion regardless of the course. If it is understood 
as a required course, race will be deferred to another course that is considered an 
elective. 
98. For a similar analysis of contract law and women, see Mary Joe Frug, Re-
Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 
1065, 1089-93 (1985) (noting the absence of materials on reproductive technology and 
marital contracts from the first year contracts course casebooks). 
This excising of subjects ofrelevance to African Americans occurs despite the ways 
in which the question of race has influenced doctrinal developments in a number of 
subject areas. See Roy L. Brooks, Anti-Minority Mindset in the Law School Personnel 
Process: Toward an Understanding of Racial Mindsets, 5 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 14 n.41 
(1987) (discussing the influence of race in civil procedure, constitutional torts, 
property, criminal procedure, labor relations, trusts and estates, and employment 
discrimination). 
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through the sale of securities-an option not available to many 
small businesses. Public corporations may touch more on the 
lives of African Americans through their pensions or their labor 
relations than through the type of governance issues discussed 
in most corporations courses. Pensions and labor relations, and 
even plant closings, however, are saved for other courses-ones 
that generally are considered highly elective. Furthermore, 
while most corporations courses include a segment on corporate 
responsibility and the composition of the corporate board, only 
the exceptional course is likely to make reference to the way 
in which board selection procedures exclude African Americans. 
Many not-for-profit corp9rations are active in African American 
communities, yet their formation and governance usually are 
not included in courses on corporations. 
Race is likely to be a central feature only in courses that 
students and faculty alike consider to be the highly elective 
courses, designated and denigrated as not central to the 
curriculum. In 1970, the Association of American Law Schools 
· suggested that a "course in race relations law or in race, racism 
· and justice could be supplemental to courses in constitutional 
and civil rights law."99 Such courses remain supplemental 
today. While many schools now have seminars in subjects like 
race discrimination law or law and racism, few give race a 
central place within the law school curriculum.10° Furthermore, 
African American law professors working toward tenure often 
99. J. Otis Cochran; The Law Schools' Programmatic Approach to Black Students, 
17 How. L.J. 358, 379 (1972) (emphasis added)(citing AsSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW 
SCHS., PROCEEDINGS: 1970 .ANNuAL MEETING (1970)). This has been recognized at least 
since 1970. See James A. McPherson, The Black Law Student: A Problem of Fidelities, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1970, at 93. McPherson notes that three Black students who 
flunked out of his law school class may have done so because: 
[T)hey failed to recognize that the study of law has no immediate relevance to 
the black community. It is almost pure study. The real relevance comes only 
after the period of training, when the individual student has to decide for himself 
what role he wants to play with the tools he has. acquired. At this point, it seems 
to me, the law becomes most relevant. 
Id. at 96. 
100. Northeastern Law School is one of the few to put racism in a central place. 
It requires all first-year law students to take the course, "Law, Culture and Differ-
ence." Northeastern University Law School, Teaching Materials for Law, Culture and 
Difference, Fall/Winter/Spring 1992-1993 (on file with the University of Michigan 
Journal of Law Reform); see also Frances L. Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum 
in Legal Education, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1511 (1991) (arguing that race should be given 
a central place in the law school curriculum because of its central place in constitu-
tional history). 
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are urged by their colleagues not to concentrate on issues like 
race and law or civil rights. African American faculty have 
been advised n<;>t to produce civil rights scholarship, or, after 
writing about race, to pull back and write on something else. 101 
If African American faculty followed this advice, the result 
would be a dearth of research on these subjects or teaching in 
these areas. 
The vast majority of courses are taught from texts that focus 
on appellate cases.102 These cases rarely state the race of the 
parties or the judge. But, in this society, if race is not indicat-
ed, the assumption is that the people involved are white. Of 
course, this assumption will be true in most cases: the majority 
of litigants are white as well as the majority of judges.103 In 
addition to the appellate cases, 104 some casebooks include 
textual materials. These additional casebook materials, howev-
er, tend not to excerpt from articles written by African Ameri-
can legal academics. 105 
101. African American faculty recounted this advice at the Plenary Session of the 
Minority Law Teachers' Conference on the subject of"Current Responses to the Bell-
Delgado Survey," held by the Association of American Law Schools in Washington, 
D.C., on Oct. 10, 1992. The Bell~Delgado Survey questioned law faculty of color about 
the conditions of their professional lives. Richard Delgado, Minority Law Professors' 
Lives: The Bell-Delgado Survey, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349 (1989). 
102. The case method of teaching was first introduced in 1870 by Christopher 
Langdell, then Dean of Harvard Law School. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN 
LAW 42-43 (1977). This method remains widely used in law schools today. For a 
detailed discussion and critique of the case method, see Russell L. Weaver, Langdell's 
Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L. REV. 517 (1991). 
103. By the mid-1980s, only three percent of judges nationwide were Black. Ellen 
L. Rosen, The View from the Bench-A National Law Journal Poll, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 
10, 1987, at S-1, S-13. One study of a small claims court showed that the over-
whelming majority of cases involved white plaintiffs suing white defendants. Arthur 
Best et al., Peace, Wealth, Happiness, and Small Claim Courts: A Case Study, 21 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343, 357 (1994). 
104. I recognize that many people supplement casebooks with their own sets of 
materials, but I have no way of analyzing these. Ever since Basic Books v. Kinko's 
Graphics, 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), in which publishers successfully sued 
the duplication business for copying book excerpts and compiling them in university 
coursepacks without authorization, I suspect fewer people are using supplements and 
those that are used are likely to be smaller than those previously used. 
105. For example, neither a well-known torts casebook, DOBBS, supra note 94, nor 
two torts anthologies, A TORTS ANTHOLOGY (Lawrence C. Levine et al. eds., 1993), and 
RoBERT L. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON ToRT LAW (3d ed. 1990), ID.elude excerpts from African 
American legal scholars' work. Furthermore, neither Dobbs' casebook nor PROSSER ET 
AL., supra note 94 (which does not include excerpts of academic material), include 
citations to the work of African American legal scholars. Many African American legal 
scholars have written in the field of torts or on closely connected subjects. Works by 
these scholars include Anita L. Allen & Erin Mack, How Privacy Got its Gender, 10 
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 441 (1990); Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and 
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The result is that legal educators only rarely refer to race. 
The uniformity of silence on race should alert us to its non-
accidental nature. This silence can be understood within the 
norm of color blindness as saying that discussions of topics that 
allude to race are unnecessary because there are no relevant 
differences between African Americans and whites. Given the 
ideology of color blindness, the silence works to construct 
African American students as white. Legal educators, who are 
themselves predominantly white, 106 teach the subjects that are 
important to them and to the predominantly white bar.107 In 
organizing their courses and their curricula around these 
subjects, legal educators implicitly make the claim that African 
American law students are, or ought to be, the same as white 
students, and that they are, or ought to be, animated by the 
same concerns that animate white students. 
In short, the dual assumptions of color blindness-that race 
is irrelevant to decisions about people and to decisions that 
people make in their own lives-affect the structure of the 
curriculum. The curriculum can be as silent on race as it is 
because race is not considered a characteristic that is relevant 
to the study of law. It is not relevant to the study of law, in 
part, because decisions about people, and their courses of 
study, should not be made based on race. In addition, according 
the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1988); 
Taunya Lovell Banks, The Scope of Section 1985(3) in Light of Great American Federal 
Savings and Loan Association v. Novotny: Too Little Too Late? 9 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
579 (1982); Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Causation, Economists, and the Dinosaur: A Response 
to Professor Dray, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1986, at 23; Okianer C. Dark, 
Is the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 the Solution for the DTP 
Controversy?, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 799 (1988); Patricia A. King, Treatment and Minors: 
Issues Not Involving Lifesaving Treatment, 23 J. FAM. L. 241 (1984-1985). 
106. LAW ScH . .ADMISSION 8ERVICFS, MlNORl'IY PARTICIPATION 1N LEGAL EDUCATION AND 
THE PROFESSION: A COMPENDIUM OF DATA tbl. VIII-1 (1990) [hereinafter MINORITY 
PARTICIPATION DATA] (reporting that minority faculty in 1989-1990 made up 8.7% of 
all faculty, including faculty at the historically Black law schools). 
107. In 1986-1987, three percent of the legal profession was African American. 
Judy Rothotz, Are Hiring Practices a Factor? Percentage of Blacks in the Profession 
Lags, N.J. L.J., Dec. 3, 1987, at 1, 30. In 1988, less than two percent of the attorneys 
employed by the nation's 250 largest law firms were Black, while fewer than one 
percent of the partners in these firms were Black. Deasy, supra note 9, at 551-52 
(citing Doreen Weisenhaus, Still a Long Way to Go for Women, Minorities; White Males 
Dominate Firms, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 1, 1, 48). In fact, more than 10% of the 
250 largest firms reported employing no African American attorneys and more than 
half had no African American partners. Id. For a study of the disproportionately low 
number of Hispanic attorneys employed in large law firms, see Linda E. Davila, The 
Underrepresentation of Hispanic Attorneys in Corporate Law Firms, 39 STAN. L. REV. 
1403 (1987). 
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to the ideology of color blindness, an individual's own decisions 
about what to study are not affected by her race. 
B. Claims of African American Inferiority 
Although law schools claim to have color-blind curricula, 
these curricula also can be seen to oppose the ideology of color 
blindness. Just as legal doctrines governing discrimination law, 
First Amendment law, and constitutional interpretation make 
overt claims to color blindness that can be reinterpreted as 
assertions of white supremacy,108 the institutional practices of 
legal education can be reread. The failure to refer to African 
Americans or African American authors in casebooks can be 
understood as a statement of their inferiority when compared 
with whites. The message conveyed is that African American 
work is not sufficiently valuable to be the subject of litigation 
or to be reproduced in legal texts. Similarly, the silence about 
African Americans in the subject matter of courses can be 
understood as a mark ofinferiority. 109 According to this inter-
pretation of the curriculum, African Americans are not simply 
colored whites, they are different and inferior. 
Law schools' implicit treatment of African American law 
students as inferior is reinforced by the strong, negative 
student reaction to the inclusion of materials on race in core 
courses. Most law faculty are familiar with the way in which 
students put down their pens the moment the subject of race 
arises in a core course. A notorious example of this is the 
demeaning response of students and faculty to Visiting Pro-
fessor Derrick Bell's Constitutional Law class at Stanford Law 
School in 1986. 110 At the time of this incident, Professor Bell 
was a well-known African American with more than seventeen 
years of law school teaching experience at Oregon, Harvard, 
Emory, Illinois, the University of Washington, and Florida 
108. See supra text accompanying notes 65-80. 
109. See Knight v. Alabama, 14 F.3d 1534, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994) (remanding for 
a determination as to whether state college curricula that marginalize the study of 
African American thought, culture, and history are traceable to earlier de jure 
segregation). 
110. Derrick Bell, The Price and Pain of Racial Perspectiue, STAN. L. SCH. J., May 
9, 1986, at 5; see also Okianer C. Dark, Just My 'Magination, 10 HARV. BLACKLETI'ER 
J. 21 (1993) (describing white student resistance to discussing race in the classroom). 
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State.111 He also had served as the Dean of the University of 
Oregon School of Law. Professor Bell taught his Constitutional 
Law class from the same casebook that other Constitutional 
Law professors used at Stanford but, unlike the other profes-
sors, Professor Bell taught the material in the order in which 
the casebook presented it: before the students encountered 
doctrinal materials, they were faced with a discussion of the 
importance of slavery and property rights in the thinking of the 
authors of the Constitution.112 According to Professor Bell: 
"[W]ithout this background, the later chapters devoted to 
contemporary racial issues are not coherent. They seem on the 
periphery of the constitutional pattern of which they may be 
the most important part. "113 
When some of the students in the class expressed dissatis-
faction, apparently believing that issues of race were not of 
particular importance to the study of constitutional law, some 
faculty members established a lecture series to supplement 
Professor Bell's course without telling him the purpose of the 
lectures.114 Ultimately, after protests by the Stanford Black 
Law Students Association, the lecture series was cancelled and 
the two dozen students who had been attending other constitu-
tional law classes slowly drifted back to Professor Bell's 
class.115 
The students' rejection of race as an appropriate topic of 
discussion could be understood as a claim that African Amer-
icans are the same as whites and that therefore the study of 
the history and context in which the Constitution was created 
is irrelevant. 116 Professor Bell, however, saw the way in which 
the lecture series was created as saying something different. 
According to Professor Bell: "The fact of my exclusion from the 
dialogues that must have taken place before so radical a 
remedy for student upset was adopted was a denial of my 
status as a faculty member and my worth as a person .... "117 
He termed the event "stigmatizing" and "demeaning."118 Even 
weeks later, he experienced "abject humiliation" and "absolute 
outrage" as a result of these events. 119 





116. See supra Part II.A. 
117. Bell, supra note 110, at 5. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
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Others also understood the episode as carrying a message of 
African American inferiority. Faculty members were embar-
rassed by the event and referred to it as "outrageous."120 They 
offered their apologies to Professor Bell, as did the Dean and 
a number of white students. This Incident serves as a reminder 
to African American faculty and students of the ease with 
which the message of African American inferiority surfaces.121 
Law students also might understand the overwhelmingly 
white character of student bodies122 and faculties 123 as a further 
indication of the inferior status of African Americans. It would 
be easy to interpret the predominant color of these bodies as 
implying that African Americans were not smart enough to get 
into law school, to stay in law school, or to be appointed to law 
school faculties. 124 
Furthermore, norms of privacy work within the law school 
environment, as they do within the larger legal system, to 
make possible the exclusion of African American students. 
African American students often find it difficult to join 
120. Id. 
121. Although the fact that Professor Bell is African American may have made it 
easier for the white students to go forward with their extraordinary plan, white 
faculty who have tried to discuss issues ofrace in the classroom have also experienced 
resistance. See, e.g., Frances L. Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal 
°Education, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1512, 1559-60 (1991) (recounting comments from students 
who saw her curricular emphasis on race as an indication of impermissible bias). 
122. In the 1991-1992 academic year, Blacks comprised only 6.3% of those attend-
ing ABA-approved law schools, despite the fact that Blacks make up approximately 
12% of the United States population. The 6.3% figure appears to include students at 
historically Black law schools. Ken Myers, Studies Suggest That Minorities Still Lag 
in Admissions, Tests, NAT'L. L.J., Feb. 24, 1992, at 4. 
123. In 1986-1987, Black faculty members constituted only 3. 7% of the faculty at 
non-historically Black schools. Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of 
Minorities and Women on American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 538 
(1988) (defining "faculty" to include non-tenure track teaching staff, such as clinical 
staff); see also MINORITY PARTICIPATION DATA, supra note 106, at tbl. VIII-1 (showing 
minority faculty in 1989-1990 to be 8.7% of all full-time professors, including all 
minority-not just Black-faculty and including the historically Black law schools); 
Delgado, supra note 101, at 351 (finding that momentum to hire minorities stalled 
in the mid-1980s). Furthermore, Black faculty tend to be tokens at the majority-run 
law schools. In 1991, over half of the ABA-approved law schools reported only two or 
fewer full-time minority (Black, Hispanic, Native American, or Asian) faculty 
members, while almost 10% of the schools continued to report no full-time minority 
faculty members at all. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS To THE BAR, A 
REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 14-63 (1991). 
124. See Ian Haney-Lopez, Community Ties, Race and Faculty Hiring: The Case 
for Professors Who Don't Think White, 21RECONSTRUCTION46, 51 (1991) (stating that 
lack of faculty diversity sends message of inferiority); but cf Richard A. Posner, 
Duncan Kennedy onAflirmatiue Action, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1157 (arguing against the use 
of affirmative action in hiring by private law schools). 
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predominantly white study groups.125 Yet, much of the learning 
and self-testing of law school takes place in these settings. 
Similarly, white faculty members often serve as mentors to 
white students, again leaving African American students out 
of many of the informal settings in which learning takes place. 
Finally, but just as importantly, African American students 
tend not to be invited. to participate in white students' small, 
informal social gatherings. These include eating meals andjust 
relaxing. Although these settings usually are not conceived of 
as educational, law school classes and law school survival 
techniques frequently are discussed. By not participating in 
these exchanges, African American students lose out on the 
lore and knowledge about the institution and its participants. 
Their exclusion from these important settings marks them as 
different. It also may mark them as inferior in that no one 
thought their ideas or company sufficiently desirable to invite 
them. 
The dominant message of sameness, with its underlying 
message of difference and inferiority, also is reinforced through 
the subject matter of the few core courses in which race is 
likely to be considered frequently. In constitutional law, race 
usually will be discussed in order to understand the develop-
ment of the Equal Protection Clause. 126 This doctrine serves as 
the paradigm of the assertion that African Americans are the 
same as whites. Beginning with the pronouncement in Dred 
Scott v. Sanford121 that African Americans are neither "citi-
zens" nor "people of the United States" within the meaning of 
the Constitution,128 and moving through the modern equal 
protection cases, the cases usually are taught to show the 
appropriateness of the norm of race-blind, equal treatment.129 
In contrast, in classes on criminal law and procedure, African 
Americans ordinarily are portrayed as dangerous to white 
125. The information in this paragraph is based on informal conversations with 
students at New England Law School and with students and faculty from several 
other law schools. It is anecdotal in character. See also Leslie G. Espinoza, Empow-
erment and Achievement in Minority Law Student Support Programs: Constructing 
Affirmative Action, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 281, 291 (1989) (emphasizing the isolation 
of students of color from both white students and faculty); see also Lawrence, supra 
note 60 (describing the unconscious racism in many white-Black interactions). 
126. "[N]or shall any state ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. 
127. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
128. Id. at 404. 
129. Cf Gotanda, supra note 18, at 62 (arguing that the ideology of race-blind 
constitutionalism actually promotes white supremacy). 
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America. Here, African Americans are the criminals-people 
who inflict or try to inflict injury on white law-abiding citi-
zens.130 Consistent with notions of race blindness, most crimi-
nal cases do not identify the race of either the defendant or the 
victim, but, those that do often identify the defendant as 
African American and occasionally identify the victim as 
white. 131 Despite the fact that a disproportionate number of 
crimes in the United States are committed against Black 
victims, 132 the identifications in these cases reinforce the 
popular construction of African Americans, and in particular, 
African American males, as dangerous to whites. 
Both the construction of African Americans as the same as 
whites and the competing construction of them as different and 
inferior have the effect of reinforcing the status quo in legal 
education. If African American students are indeed the same 
as white students, then there is no need to adjust legal educa-
tion to accommodate the presence of slowly increasing numbers 
of African American students. These new students should fit 
right in, simply replacing or adding to the white students who 
traditionally have been present. Similarly, if African American 
students are different from and inferior to white students, 
there is no reason to change legal education to take their needs 
into account. To do so would diminish the quality of legal 
education, downgrading it from the high standard previously 
provided to white students to a lower quality of education that 
African Americans could survive.133 Thus, construction of 
African American law students as either the same or different 
130. Crenshaw, supra note 89, at 4 (noting that "[i]t is not unusual for [criminal 
law] professors to base a hypothetical on the presence of a Black·person in a white 
neighborhood"); WILLIAMS, supra note 63, at 80-90 (discussing the use of racial 
classifications in law school exam questions). 
131. A review of the first 35 Supreme Court cases excerpted in JAMES B. HADDAD 
ET AL., CASES AND CoMMENTS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 1992), reveals that the 
race of the defendant or the victim is disclosed in only four cases. In one, the 
defendant is identified as being Black and the victim as white. Id. at 13 (excerpting 
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)). In the second, the defendant is Black and 
is noted to have sold drugs to a Black undercover cop; there is no victim. Id. at 266 
(excerpting Mason v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977)). In the third, the victim is 
described as white, but the defendant's race is not given, id. at 160 (excerpting Brewer 
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)), while in the fourth the Court implies that the 
defendant is Black. Id. at 388 (excerpting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). 
132. Irene Sege, Race, Violence Make Complex Picture, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 1990, 
at 1. The vast majority of victims of violent crime are the victims of someone of their 
own race. Id. African Americans, however, are overrepresented both among the victims 
of crime and those who commit crimes. Id. 
133. See infra text accompanying notes 193-200. 
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and inferior to whites serves to legitimate the continuation of 
the status quo in legal education. 
III. THE DISCOURSE OF COLOR BLINDNESS AND LEGAL 
EDUCATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
AND ACADEMIC SUPPORT PROGRAMS 
There are two areas oflegal discourse in which silence on the 
issue of race is particularly difficult: affirmative action and 
academic support programs. Both of these programs are 
associated primarily with students of color, even if they also 
serve some white students.134 In both of these areas, the 
dominant discourse constructs African American students as 
white. Sometimes this is clear from the language used; other 
times it is implicit. As with the rest oflegal education, howev-
er, there is also a discourse that constructs African American 
students as different and inferior. 
One way that academic support programs construct African 
American students as white is through their emphasis on 
enhancing students' skills. There are many different types of 
academic support programs135-summer programs, tutorial 
programs, special legal writing programs-but most of them 
are aimed primarily at improving the students' abilities to 
write and to spot issues.136 The implication is that the partici-
pating African American students' skills can be made indis-
tinguishable from the non-participating white students' skills. 
For example, the CLEO program, one of the earliest and best 
known academic support programs, traditionally devoted 
approximately fifty percent of its curriculum to the develop-
ment of legal writing skills. 137 The emphasis on improving 
analytical and writing skills continues today. The current 
Mellon Program at the University of Pittsburgh focuses on 
these skills: "Writing and analytical skills are emphasized 
134. See infra note 164 and accompanying text. 
135. As of 1988, at least 62 law schools had academic support programs. MINORITY 
AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 73, 97, 125 (listing the law schools with 
summer orientation, tutorial, and legal writing programs). 
136. Espinoza, supra note 125, at 291. 
137. Alfred A. Slocum, CLEO: Anatomy of Success, 22 How. L.J. 335, 357 (1979); 
see also Leo M. Romero et al., The Legal Education of Chicano Students: A Study in 
Mutual Accommodation and Cultural Conflict, 5 N.M. L. REV. 177, 219 (1975) (noting 
that each regional CLEO summer institute was required to have a writing program). 
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because these are the skills that will ultimately determine the 
individual's success or failure as a law student."138 The New 
England School of Law has run both an intensive, weekend-
long writing workshop and a "drop-in" writing clinic. 139 
Other programs emphasize substantive knowledge. 140 The 
assumption behind these programs is that African American 
students do not perform as well on their examinations and 
papers as white students because they have less knowledge of 
the material. Recent examples of substantive programs include 
the Academic Support Program of the University ofOregon,141 
the Charles Hamilton Houston Enrichment Program at the 
New England School of Law, and the support program recom-
mended by the LSAC. 142 All three programs involve both 
substantive seminars and individualized tutorials. 143 
138. Deasy, supra note 9, at 569; see also Thomas W. Christopher & Frederick M. 
Hart, Indian Law Scholarship Program at the University of New Mexico, 1970 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 691 (describing a pre-law school summer program aimed at teaching written 
and oral argument); Brenda S. Hampden, Preparing Undergraduate Minority Students 
for the Law School Experience, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 207, 218 (1989) (noting that 
Seton Hall's pre-law program added a legal writing component); David E. Neely, 
Minority Participation in Legal Education: Innovative Approaches Toward Racial 
Parity, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 559, 575 (1986) (describing John Marshall Law School's 
emphasis on development of writing skills); Henry Ramsey, Jr., Affirmative Action 
at American Bar Association Approved Law Schools: 1979-1980, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 377, 
389 (1980) (describing academic support programs' goals of improving writing skills); 
_Stephen R. Ripps, A Curriculum Course Designed for Lowering the Attrition Rate for 
the Disadvantaged Law Student, 29 How. L.J. 457, 466-80 (1986) (proposing an 
introduction to the law course which would teach, among other things, case briefing 
and legal writing); Nerissa Bailey-Scott Skillman, Misperceptions Which Operate as 
Barriers to the Education of Minority Law Students, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 553, 557-58 
(1986) (emphasizing minority students' difficulties with legal writing). 
139. I chaired the Task Force that reorganized New England's programs for 
minority students from 1989-1991, and then administered the newly created "Charles 
H~lton Houston Enrichment Program" during the 1991-1992 academic year. 
140. It would be inaccurate to imply, and therefore I do not mean to do so, that 
most programs fail to attack writing skills, substantive deficits, and learning 
methodologies simultaneously. 
141. This program is described in Finke, supra note 14, at 61-70. 
142. LAW SCH. ADMISSION CoUNCII/LAW SCH. ADMISSION SERVICES, AN INTRoDUCTION 
To AcADEMIC AssISTANCE PRooRAMS (1992) [hereinafter AcADEMIC AssISTANCE PRooRAMS]; 
see also Richard F. Devlin & A. Wayne MacKay, An Essay on Institutional Responsibil-
ity: The Indigenous Blacks and Micmac Programme at Dalhousie Law School, 14 
DALHOUSIE L.J. 296, 314-15 (1991) (describing institution of subject-matter tutorials); 
Romero et al., supra note 137, at 223-25 (describing a programmed studies course 
designed primarily for Mexican American students). 
143. The LSAC proposal has four components in an academic year: seminars, small 
group sessions, individual sessions, and examination writing sessions. The seminars 
are intended to clarify, expand upon, and assist in the synthesis of the information 
presented in the large classes, while the small group sessions provide more intensive 
analysis of the information conveyed by the professor. In the individual sessions, 
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Still other programs focus on learning skills instead of either 
writing ability or substantive knowledge. For example, Paul 
Wangerin recommends that students be taught to learn inde-
pendently.144 He believes that those students who "experience 
academic difficulty'' are dependent learners. This would explain 
why students in undergraduate academic support programs 
show only short term grade improvement. 145 The case method, 
according to Wangerin, is a useful vehicle for teaching indepen-
dent learning because it "force[s] students to formulate their 
own solutions to their academic problems."146 
Regardless of the specific emphasis of a particular academic 
support program, they are all premised on the assumption that 
African American students would do better in law school if only 
they could bring their skill level up to that of white students. 
Furthermore, these programs would not exist if it were not 
assumed that such skill improvement was possible. Katherine 
Vaughns, for example, notes that law students with "high 
predictors"-the students admitted through the "regular" ad-
missions process-undoubtedly have mastered the skills re-
quired in order to "think like lawyers."147 The challenge for law 
faculty, according to Vaughns, is to teach the specially 
admitted-minority-students to think like these regularly 
admitted-white-students. 148 Similarly, a description of a 
model academic support program, prepared for the Law School 
Admission Council/Law School Admission Services, asserts: 
students can focus on legal issues that are posing particular difficulty for them. 
ACADEMIC AsSISTANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 142, at 27-31. 
The Oregon School of Law program also includes support seminars, small-group 
or individual sessions, and review sessions. The seminars are intended to provide a 
second opportunity for the student to become familiar with the material from the large 
classes; the small-group or individual sessions are occasions for synthesizing the 
material periodically; the review sessions allow for summations at the end of the 
semester. Finke, supra note 14, at 63-64. 
The New England School of Law program offers a six-week seminar in the spring 
semester that involves substantive faculty lectures and student-run tutorial reviews 
of written answers to problems developed by the faculty. See supra note 139 and 
accompanying text. 
144. Wangerin, supra note 7, at 802; see also Edmund W. Gordon, Educating More 
Minority Engineers, 91 TECH. REV. 69, 72 (1988) (arguing that support programs should 
stress problem-solving skills); Katherine L. Vaughns, Towards Parity in Bar Passage 
Rates and Law School Performance: Exploring the Sources of Disparities between 
Racial and Ethnic Groups, 16 T. MARsHALL L. REV. 425, 470-74 (1991) (stressing the 
need to teach "problem-solving" skills to students of color). 
145. Wangerin, supra note 7, at 786. 
146. Id. at 797-801. 
147. Vaughns, supra note 144, at 470. 
148. Id. 
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"The primary goal of an academic support program should be 
to help students develop the abilities that are necessary to 
independently proceed with their legal education."149 In short, 
the goal of support programs is to give the students in the 
academic support program the skills that the white students 
who are not in the program presumptively already possess. 
This fundamental assumption of African American students' 
sameness in relation to white students is signalled by the 
terms used to describe students who participate in the pro-
grams. Students rarely are described in racial terms. Instead, 
they are referred to as "nontraditional students" or students 
"with special needs."150 These terms presumably are intended 
to indicate the inclusive nature of the programs, since both 
white and African American, as well as Hispanic and Native 
American, students fit within these categories. In other pro-
grams, eligibility is based on predictors of academic success, 
such as Law School Achievement Tests (LSATs) and under-
graduate grade point averages (GPAs).151 Again, this language 
implies that eligibility to participate in the programs is based 
on neutral, non-racial criteria. Once more, the implication is 
that there is no difference between white students and African 
American students. 
Thus, the entire existence of academic support programs is 
based on the premise that African American and other minority 
students are fundamentally the same as'white students and 
that whatever superficial differences may exist can be corrected 
through education. Academic support programs do not deny the 
uncontroverted fact that African American students often do 
not perform as well in law school as their white counterparts. 
Instead of attributing these differences in performance to 
fundamental differences between African American and white 
students' identities or to possible pro-white biases in legal 
149. ACADEMIC AsSISTANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 142, at 13. 
150. See, e.g., id. at 1, 2 (using the term "nontraditional" to apply to students who 
might participate iii an academic support program); Deasy, supra note 9, at 564 
(describing the placement of Black students with other "nontraditional" students as 
a way ofreducing stigma); see also Finke, supra note 14, at 62 (noting that the Oregon 
Law School academic assistance program includes older students returning to school, 
students with large differences between their Law School Achievement Test (LSAT) 
scores and their undergraduate grade point averages (GPAs), and disabled students 
in an academic support program). 
151. Espinoza, supra note 125, at 285-86 (showing how the use of predictors to 
identify students for support programs allows schools to ignore their role in perpet-
uating minority students' failures). 
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education, the substance of those programs reasserts the 
superficiality of any differences. Because skill deficiencies can 
be remedied, such deficiencies do not challenge the perceived 
sameness of African American and white law students. 
Because law schools treat African American students the 
same as white ones, continued inadequate or disappointing 
performances by African American students, even after com-
pleting support programs, is likely to be understood as a result 
of the choices made by those students. Poor performance often 
is seen as the result of decisions by the student not to study 
enough, not to seek out peer or professorial assistance, or to 
engage in extracurricular activities at the expense of academic 
ones. 152 Consistent with color-blind ideology, 153 law schools 
treat these choices as unrelated to the individual's racial 
identity. The result is that African American law students who 
do not perform well are seen as similar to white students who 
simply have made bad choices about their use of time. 
Discussions of affirmative action also focus on the superfici-
ality of the differences between African American and white 
applicants for student or faculty positions, as well as on their 
basic similarity to each other. Proponents and opponents both 
endorse the position that race is not a relevant factor in 
determining a student's success in law school. Advocates of 
affirmative action admissions programs often admit that 
African American law school applicants may not perform as 
well as white applicants on standardized tests like the LSAT 
and that their undergraduate GP As may be lower, but these 
lapses can be explained by a whole host of skills-related 
factors. 154 Once African American applicants matriculate in law 
school, however, the advocates of affirmative action programs 
often reject special treatment for the newly registered students. 
Instead, these advocates claim that African American students 
152. See Cheryl E. Amana,Recruitment and Retention oftheAfricanAmericanLaw 
Student, 19 N.C. CENT. L.J. 207, 214-16 (1991) (emphasizing the need for environ-
mental as well as skill-related support services); Deasy, supra note 9, at 568 n.95 
(recognizing the dangers to Black law students from extracurricular overload); see also 
Melinda Henneberger, Escaping Mean Streets, a Student Still Struggles, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 18, 1994, at Bl (describing choices made by an African American college 
student). 
153. See supra notes 30-35, 41~0 and accompanying text (discussing the failure 
to consider the effects of race on choice in Bostick and Croson). 
154. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 91, at 569 (citing poor urban schools and poor 
. health care as reasons for poor African American academic performance in general). 
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should be treated the same as white law students. 155 In doing 
so, they are asserting that there are no differences between 
African American and white law students that are significant 
enough to require rethinking traditional legal education. 
While proponents support affirmative action based on norms 
of equality, opponents, including African American opponents, 
often oppose it as violating the norms of color blindness. Oppo-
nents argue that all things being equal, it is not fair to prefer 
African American applicants over white applicants. As William 
Rasberry argues: "A black graduate of a black college ... who 
scores 36 on the LSAT may strike the admissions officer of a 
top-ranked law school as a diamond in the rough. But what of 
the black applicant whose undergraduate school was Yale?"156 
The implication here is that if Yale is an applicant's under-
graduate institution, then that applicant should be considered 
the same as a white student, regardless of the color of the 
applicant's skin. 
Opponents of affirmative action also argue against it by 
calling it "reverse discrimination." For example, Lino Graglia 
asserts that "[t]he only point of contention" in considering 
affirmative action programs is "whether it is appropriate and 
desirable to grant preference to some applicants and, therefore, 
to exclude others solely on the basis of race."157 He concludes, 
not surprisingly, that granting such a preference is not appro-
priate because the consideration of race constitutes "racial 
· discrimination."158 By redescribing affirmative action as dis-
crimination, Graglia implies that African Americans and 
whites are similarly situated, and that institutions that prac-
tice affirmative action are choosing people based on superficial 
differences rather than merit. 159 This assumption of underlying, 
155. Michel Marriott, Storm at Georgetown Law on Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
17, 1991, at A14; Mary Roberts, Article lnfiames GU Law Center, THE HOYA, Apr. 19, 
1991, at 1, 5; see also Charles E. Daye, On Blackberry Picking, Generation.s of 
Affirmative Action, and Less Dangerous Enterprises: An Open Letter to Stephen Carter, 
45 STAN. L. REV. 485, 488 (1993) (noting that law school simply provides African 
American students with a chance to compete, regardless of the circumstances of 
admission). 
156. William Raspberry, Race and Fairness at Georgetown Law, WASH. POST, Apr. 
19, 1991, at A23. 
157. Lino A. Graglia, Race Norming in Law School Admissions, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
97, 99 (1992). 
158. Id. at 102. 
159. See RAND<>M HOUSE CoLLEGE DICTIONARY 379 (rev. ed.1975) (defining"discrimi-
nation" as "treatment or distinction not based on individual merit in favor of or 
against a person, group, etc."). 
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fundamental "sameness" fits with the ideology of color blind-
ness in legal education and in the legal system. 
Judge Posner argues for a similar view of affirmative action, 
which he refers to "more bluntly, [as] reverse discrimina-
tion."160 Again, the use of the term "reverse discrimination," 
like Graglia's "racial discrimination," implies that the subjects 
under consideration are fundamentally the same. But here, the 
term undoubtedly receives part of its power because the word 
"reverse" makes the reader wonder what "non-reverse" discrim-
ination is. "Discrimination," unmodified, reminds us of the 
claims of differential and inferior treatment of African Ameri-
cans made by civil rights advocates during the 1950s and 
1960s. In this historical context, the word "discrimination" was 
used to imply a claim of sameness-that African Americans 
were essentially the same as whites and entitled to the same 
rights. 161 Posner's use of"reverse discrimination" draws on this 
historical claim of equality from the Civil Rights era. 
Judge Posner then argues against the use of affirmative 
action in faculty hiring because faculty members hired under 
such programs ultimately can be expected to receive unfavor-
able tenure decisions. According to him: 
Not every competent untenured faculty member is expected 
to get tenure .... What then are the tenure standards for 
the affirmative action hires to be? If they are the same 
tenure standards as for white males, then probably a 
disproportionate number of blacks will not make tenure, 
and this will be more than awkward. What is to be done? 
Are there to be two tenure tracks? If so, will voting on 
tenure in the affirmative action track be limited to 
blacks?162 
Instead of attempting to answer any of the questions he poses, 
Judge Posner changes the subject, moving to a discussion of 
the problem of hiring entry level African American faculty. 163 
160. Posner, supra note 124, at 1157 (responding to Kennedy, supra note 36); but 
see Culp, supra note 93 (interpreting Judge Posner's argument as part of a continuing 
effort of white scholars to dominate the legal academy). 
161. For a discussion of the longstanding debate within the African American 
community as to whether African Americans should assert a claim to equal inclusion 
in white society or whether they should claim difference, see Peller, supra note 19. 
162. Posner, supra note 124, at 1159-60. 
163. Id. at 1160. 
FALL 1994) Erasing Race from Legal Education 87 
Thus, he moves rapidly from "firing'' to "hiring" African Ameri-
can faculty, playing perhaps on the similarity between the two 
words and what he sees as the natural relationship between 
the two processes: those African American who are hired for 
faculty positions eventually will have to be fired. 
By leaving the question of tenure standards for African 
American faculty unanswered, Judge Posner appears to believe 
that the question is rhetorical. He expects the readers to 
endorse the proposition that a standard that treats African 
Americans as identical with whites is the right one, and 
implies that hiring faculty pursuant to an affirmative action 
plan will create awkward situations because African American 
faculty will be unable to meet merit-based tenure standards. 
Yet, Posner fails to consider the possibility of rethinking the 
tenure standards themselves. In short, Judge Posner follows 
a strategy of asserting that African Americans and whites 
should be judged by the same standards for tenure, while 
recognizing that African Americans perform poorly when 
judged by those standards. 
The dominant discourse for proponents and opponents of both 
affirmative action and academic support programs may be one 
that asserts that African American students and faculty are 
the same as their white counterparts. There is, however, a 
competing refrain that constructs African Americans as differ-
ent, inferior, and dangerous. This construction of inferiority 
derives from the claim of equality. Although academic support 
programs use racially neutral language to describe eligible stu-
dents, most academic support programs have a dispropor-
tionately low percentage of white students when compared to 
the. law school's population.164 As a result, even those programs 
that do not formally define themselves in terms of the students' 
race will serve vastly disproportionate numbers of African 
American and other non-white students. This means that while 
the programs may not be defined explicitly in terms of race, 
they will be understood as being race-based. Furthermore, 
academic support programs may not be able to provide the 
flexible hours that nontraditional students might need or the 
facilities and assistance that students with different abilities 
might require for success. In fact, students often conclude that 
164. For example, the Charles Hamilton Houston Program at the New England 
School of Law routinely has an enrollment that is over 70% minority while the school 
itself has a minority enrollment of under 10%. Conversation with Professor Robert 
V. Ward, Administrator, Charles Hamilton Houston Program (Apr. 3, 1995). 
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programs for "nontraditional" or "special needs" students are 
race-based and thus complain of racial discrimination in being 
disproportionately excluded from such programs.165 The mere 
existence of academic support programs that disproportionately 
involve students of color emphasizes the present difference 
between African American and white students while holding 
out the hope for future sameness. 
Racially neutral eligibility criteria for participation , in 
academic support programs also serve to emphasize the African 
American students' difference from other, predominantly white, 
students. Labeling academic support program students as 
being "nontraditional" or as having "special needs" simul-
taneously defines the non-academic support students as the 
"traditional," "normal" students. These "traditional" students 
become the model against which other students are mea-
sured.166 In this way, the language makes a claim that the 
African American students are no different from others.:_ 
simply nontraditional, but so, perhaps, are some whites-and 
simultaneously asserts the African American students' differ-
ence by setting them up against the model of the traditional 
white student. 
Like the discourse of affirmative action programs, their 
pedagogy emphasizes African American students' difference. 
Guidelines for support programs often encourage instructors 
to use hypotheticals drawn from fact situations that are 
thought to be of particular relevance to African American 
communities. For example, one model program states: "[H]ypo-
thetical examples [in the support program] should, to the 
extent possible, reflect' the students' diverse life experiences 
and cultural backgrounds."167 This is undoubtedly correct; hypo-
theticals in a support program should show the students how 
law can be meaningful to them. Stressing hypotheticals of 
particular relevance to African American communities in 
support programs, however, implies that these same 
hypotheticals would be of less relevance outside of academic 
support classes-in regular classes dominated by white stu-
dents. 
165. Judith G. Greenberg & Robert V. Ward, Teaching Race and the Law through 
Narrative, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming 1995). 
166. See Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 14 
(1989) (arguing that differences are only constructed in reference to a norm). 
167. ACADEMIC AsSISTANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 142, at 28. The lives of the 
students involved in the academic support program are described as "diverse," thus 
indicating their difference from the "non-diverse," presumably white, students. See 
supra text accompanying note 150. 
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Another way in which the pedagogy of academic support 
programs undermines its prime statement about color blind-
ness is through an emphasis on the need to provide role models 
for African American students. Academic support programs 
often claim that one of their goals is "[flostering a sense of 
competence and belonging" among the students involved. 168 As 
one description of a model program notes, this is a "particularly 
challenging [objective] in academic institutions where few role 
models exist."169 If African American law students were funda-
mentally the same as white law students and if the only 
difference were the superficial difference in skill levels upon 
entering law school, then the role model issue should not be a 
problem. After all, there is no reason to think that all members 
of current law faculty had high skill levels upon entering law 
school.170 Those faculty whose skill levels were once relatively 
low may need to be encouraged to serve as mentors, but they 
should already be there. White faculty who had low skill levels 
as entering law students, or even as undergraduates, could 
serve as role models. 
The goal of making academic support students feel as if they 
belong is challenging because the low skills category serves as 
a substitute for race. The role models that these programs are 
looking for are not those who received an award for "most 
improved" whiie in law school, but rather those who are 
African American. In fact, faculty members' skill levels upon 
entering law school probably are irrelevant to their utility as 
role models. 171 Thus, we deny African American students' 
difference from white students by claiming that whatever 
differences there may be are superficial and remediable; and 
yet, we reinstate those differences and recognize their centrali-
ty by noting the need for African American role models. 
The language of academic support programs not only serves 
to identify the programs with race, setting their students apart 
168. ACADEMIC AsSISTANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 142, at 2. 
169. Id. 
170. Almost 60% oflaw faculty hired in the 1980s had served on law review. Robert 
J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Gatekeepers of the Profession: An Empirical Profile 
of the Nation's Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 191, 206 tbl. 7 (1991). 
171. See Anita L. Allen, On Being a Role Model, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 22, 25, 
30-31 (1990-1991) (arguing that Black women teachers can serve as role models for 
Black female students because they have experienced racism and because they can 
show students that Black women can succeed as intellectuals); Richard Delgado, 
Affirmatiue Action as a Majoritarian Deuice: Or, Do You Really Want to be a Role 
Model? 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222 (1991) (describing a role model's function as co-opting 
students into the system). 
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from the white students, it also marks the students as inferi-
or.172 This is done through the discussion of the students' skill 
deficiencies. Support programs, having diagnosed the African 
American students' problems as ones of skill, seek to teach 
students to read complex materials, to analyze or synthesize 
these materials, to write or think like a lawyer, or to learn 
independently.173 In doing so, they imply that only the students 
in the programs are lacking in these skills. One program 
description, for example, says, "summer academic assistance 
programs offer a valuable opportunity for [nontraditional] 
students to prepare for the academic challenges presented in 
law school."174 This suggests that only "nontraditional" law stu-
dents-African Americans or other students of color-will need 
a whole summer of assistance to prepare for law school's 
"challenges." Similarly, most academic year support programs 
involve skills review, which assumes that the students in the 
program are especially in need of this review. Finally, failure 
to perform adequately, after completion of an academic support 
program, may simply reinforce the message of inferiority. 
Affirmative action programs function in the same w~y. 
African American law students are marked as inferior to white 
students simply by virtue of their inability to meet the normal 
admissions standards that are based on the supposedly neutral 
results of objective testing.175 Stephen Carter argues that 
affirmative action programs are undesirable for African Ameri-
cans precisely because they cause African Americans to be 
labeled as inferior.176 According to Carter, such programs 
choose among Blacks to locate the "best [B]lack"-a person 
understood as unable to compete with the best person overall 
for the job or class seat.177 This reinforces "the durable and 
demeaning stereotype of [B]lack people as unable to compete 
with white ones."178 
172. Espinoza, supra note 125, at 286-90 (recognizing the dual message of support 
programs as simultaneously one of support and stigma). 
173. See supra notes 135-49 and accompanying text. 
174. ACADEMIC AsSISTANCE PROGRAMS, supra note 142, at 27. 
175. For a discussion of the gender and cultural biases of many LSAT test 
questions, see Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSAT: Narratives and Bias, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER 
& L. 121 (1993). 
176. CARTER, supra note 27, at 47-69. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 50; see also Torry, supra note 93, at Al, A9 (asserting that "minority 
students who gain entrance to the [law] school strictly on merit tend to be viewed as 
if they had received preference"). 
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Not only do affirmative action and academic support pro-
grams portray African American students as inferior, they 
depict African American students as dangerous to the white 
students. African Americans often have been characterized as 
threatening to whites. Throughout American history, African 
Americans have been portrayed as violent toward the person 
and property of whites. 179 Furthermore, the stereotype of the 
highly sexually charged African American male and of the 
lascivious African American female play prominent roles in the 
white American imagination.180 These stereotypes of violence 
and sexuality evoke intertwined fears in whites for their 
security and identities. The very presence of African Americans 
179. For examples from literature, see Loyle Hairston, William Styron's Nat 
Turner-Rogue-Nigger, in WILLIAM STYRoN'S NAT TURNER: TEN BLACK WRITERS RESPOND 
70 (John Henrik Clarke ed., 1968) [hereinafter RESPONSE TO NAT TuRNER) (accusing 
Styron of portraying the Turner revolt against slavery as "mere wanton savagery" 
against whites); Charles V. Hamilton, Our Nat Turner and William Styron's Creation, 
in· RESPONSE TO NAT TuRNER, supra, at 77 (describing Styron's Nat Turner as confirming 
white America's racist beliefs that kindness to African Americans will simply be repaid 
by murder). For examples from current news stories, see Crenshaw & Peller, supra 
note 25, at 61 (emphasizing that the defense in the Rodney King case described King's 
African American body, even while on the ground with baton blows raining down on 
him, as "cocked" and "in a trigger position"); Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the 
Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 127, 137 (1987) (noting that local residents of Howard Beach felt that 
the attack on three African Americans who had left their stalled car in an effort to 
seek help was justified because the African Americans were in a white neighborhood 
and it is better to be safe than sorry); Michael Grunwald, For Boston, Harsh Remind-
er: 5 Years Ago, Stuart's Racist Hoax Was Hatched-And Believed, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 
4, 1994, at 17 (quoting Ozell Hudson of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under 
Law who said, in relation to the Charles Stuart and Susan Smith cases, "Black people 
have always been stereotyped as criminals in this country, and it's clear that people 
are still willing to believe those stereotypes"); Charles M. Sennott, Case Confirms 
Some Fears of Racism in S.C. Town, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 6, 1994, at 22 (noting that 
Susan Smith's and Charles Stuart's allegations that African American men were 
responsible for violent crimes against whites, coupled with white America's willingness 
to think of African American men as potentially criminal, resulted in the detention 
or suspicion oflarge numbers of innocent African Americans in Union County, South 
Carolina; and the Mission Hill area of Boston); see also Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa 
Loquitur, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 787 (1994) (indicating that over 56% of Americans 
believe African Americans to be violence prone). 
180. See, e.g., HAzEL V. CARBY, REcoNSTRUCTING WOMANHOOD 27-39 (1987) (describing 
the sexual stereotypes of Black women in antebellum southern literature); PATRICIA 
HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT 166-73 (1991) (depicting the treatment of Black 
women's bodies and sexuality as the foundation of modern pornography); JACQUELYN 
Down HALL, REvOLT AGAINsr CHIVALRY: JESSIE DANIEL AMEs AND THE WoMEN's CAMPAIGN 
AGAINST LYNCHING 145-4 7 (rev. ed. 1993) (discussing the widely held view in the South 
at the turn of the century that African American men were "lustful black brutes"); 
Kimber le Crenshaw, Whose Story Is It Anyway?, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING 
POWER 402, 411-14 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) (discussing the effect of these myths on 
societal response to rape and harassment of Black women). 
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in law schools may prove dangerous for whites. The danger 
derives from two sources. First, African Americans may wrest 
from whites property to which whites are entitled. Second, the 
mere existence of African American students in a predominant-
ly white law school may imperil white identity by threatening 
the purity of the school's standards and the quality of the 
education that it provides. 
Affirmative action programs routinely are understood as 
depriving white applicants of seats in a class-seats to which 
whites feel they are entitled.181 This idea of white entitlement 
underlies the recent controversy over the Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center's admissions policy. On April 8, 1991, Timothy 
Maguire, a third year student at Georgetown, wrote an opinion 
piece for the school's newspaper claiming that African Ameri-
can law students' LSAT scores and undergraduate GPAs were 
significantly lower than whites'. 182 The practice of preferential 
admissions for African Americans, he asserted, "almost certain-
ly creat[es] more serious problems than it ... solv[es]."183 
Maguire's article focused on LSAT scores, assuming that 
those scores are neutral entrance criteria.184 He devoted at 
least half of his two-column article to a discussion of the LSAT 
scores of Georgetown's African American and white applicants 
and accepted students, and to the scores of students at the 
historically Black schools of Howard, Morehouse, Hampton, 
Jackson State, and Grambling. In the midst of this discussion 
of scores, Maguire states that "[t]he biggest problem is that in 
every area and at every level of postsecondary education black 
181. For a full description this phenomenon, see Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as 
Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1777-84 (1993); see also ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF 
A PRIVILEGED CLASS 111-13 (1993); (analyzing the percentage of Blacks and Hispanics 
who have been unfairly promoted over white males, as reported by a 1993 Newsweek 
Magazine poll of white males, and asking why, if that poll is accurate, Blacks and 
Hispanics on average earn less and hold lower positions than whites); Carl A. 
Auerbach, The Silent Opposition of Professors and Graduate Students to Preferential 
Affirmative Action Programs: 1969 and 1975, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1253 (1988) 
(citing a 1975 survey which indicated that large numbers of white faculty and 
students believed their own opportunities would be diminished by affirmative action 
programs). 
182. Timothy Maguire, Admissions Apartheid, GEO. L. WKLY., Apr. 8, 1991, at 5. 
I am thankful to the administration of Georgetown, and particularly Laura A. Bedard, 
Special Collections Librarian and Archivist, for making materials related to this 
controversy available to me. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. But see Espinoza, supra note 175, at 127-38 (describing gender and 
cultural bias of LSAT questions). 
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achievements are far inferior to those ofwhites."185 How he has 
measured this inferiority is unclear. Presumably he believes 
that it is indicated, at least in part, by the scores. 186 
Maguire's argument against Georgetown's affirmative action 
program is that it forces Georgetown to lower its admission 
standards for African American applicants, not because they 
have been harmed by a "lack of black role models" or a "hostile 
environment" in their undergraduate educations, but because 
African American applicants have lower grades and scores. 187 
The implication is that whites are injured by affirmative action 
programs like Georgetown's because such programs create 
"artificial" preferences, rather than remedying past harms to 
African Americans.188 Maguire's use of the term "artificial" 
implies that LSAT scores, in contrast, are "natural" sifting 
criteria. A number of authors, however, have argued that the 
LSAT is culturally biased toward white, upper middle class 
students.189 
The claim of injury to whites was echoed by others who 
commented on Maguire's article. One columnist worried about 
the frustration and anger of white students who "wonder what 
they did to have been denied ... admittance ... on account of 
race."190 A Georgetown law student remarked: "[E]very white 
male here thinks that if he was black or a woman or some 
other minority, they'd be at Harvard or Yale or some other 
university .... That's not true, but that's the impression."191 
Another Georgetown law student noted that he believed 
Maguire's objection to the affirmative action program was that 
185. Maguire, supra note 182, at 5. 
186. LSAT scores, however, do not measure educational achievement. The Law 
School Admissions Service claims that the test "is designed to perform . . . the task 
of predicting academic success in the first year of law school." LAW SCH. ADMISSION 
SERVICES, THE LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION TEST: SOURCES, CONTENTS, USES 5 (1991). 
187. Maguire, supra note 182, at 5. 
188. See id. 
189. See, e.g., Espinoza, supra note 175, at 134-38 (describing cultural bias of 
LSAT questions); David M. White, Culturally Biased Testing and Predictive Invalidity: 
Putting Them on the Record, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89, 108-14 (1979) (arguing 
that both the content of the questions and the mannering of administering the LSAT 
are culturally biased against African Americans); see also Katherine Connor & Ellen 
J. V argyas, The Legal Implications of Gender Bias in Standardized Testing, 7 BERKELEY 
WOMEN'S L.J. 13, 25 (1992) (recognizing that what might be seen as gender differences 
in SAT performance may really be attributable to racial differences). 
190. Richard Cohen, At Georgetown: Thboos ... , WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 1991, atA23. 
191. Torry, supra note 93, at A9. 
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it causes "white people [to] have a tougher road to hoe."192 The 
implication is that affirmative action programs do injury to 
whites by depriving them of the class seats that, by right, 
ought to be theirs. 
Affirmative action programs also are portrayed as dangerous 
to white students because they may cause a reduction in 
intellectual standards. 193 An article written by Clyde Summers 
in 1970 provides an example of this position. 194 Summers 
claimed that it was a mistake to admit into law school minority 
students with lower GPAs and LSAT scores than white stu-
dents. According to him, preferential admissions programs 
served only to move minority students from law schools at 
which their scores would make them competitive, to law 
schools whose expectations they simply could not meet.195 As 
a result, the very students who are to be helped by the admis-
sions policies are in fact injured. Instead of competing equally 
with their classmates, they are at an immediate disadvan-
tage.19s 
192. Reid Prouty, Letter to the Editor: In Support of Affirmative Action, GEO. L. 
WKLY., Apr. 16, 1991, at 3. Prouty responds by arguing that "in the big scheme of 
things, the unfairness that whites suffer here is trivial compared to what blacks do 
across the board." Id. Another Georgetown law student noted that affirmative action 
has its price but said that he, "as a white male, [was] willing to pay that price." 
Saundra Torry, Affirmative Action a Flash Point at GU, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1991, 
at Dl, 06; cf Paul D. Carrington, Diversity! 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1105, 1106 (arguing 
that the affirmative action movement seeks •a payment made by educational 
institutions, at the expense of individuals seeking admission or employment, to 
compensate members of groups said to be disadvantaged"). 
193. See Carrington, supra note 192, at 1134 (noting that a program to encourage 
faculty to "investO more effort in mentoring [minority] students," along with the 
admission ofless qualified students, could result in declines in the quality of teaching 
and research); see also CARTER, supra note 27, at 26 (acknowledging the fear that 
affirmative action programs cause a lowering of academic standards). 
194. Clyde W. Summers, Preferential Admissions: An Unreal Solution to a Real 
Problem, 1970 U. TOL. L. REV. 377. It is not my argument that Professor Summers was, 
in 1970, in any way more racist than any of the white law school faculty who 
supported affirmative action admissions programs. Summers describes his own pain 
at raising questions about the value of the programs: 
To raise questions about this program in which so many so deeply believe almost 
inevitably leads to misunderstanding, no matter how hard one tries to make 
himself understood. More troublesome, what one writes may be seized upon and 
used by those who seek excuses for doing nothing and thus preserving the 
present pattern of deprivation. 
Id. at 380. 
195. Id. at 394-95. 
196. Id. at 381-85. 
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Even assuming that lower grades and LSAT scores actually 
reflect a lower level of skills, there are two possible responses 
to Summers' argument. The first is that teaching could be 
aimed at the capabilities of the less competent group of stu-
dents. This would ensure that they are able to learn; the more 
able students presumably would have no trouble learning. The 
second possibility-the one that Summers simply assumed is 
the correct practice-is to aim the class at the more advanced 
level, leaving the other students scrambling to keep up. Sum-
mers saw this as damaging to the egos of the less advanced 
students who would always feel inferior. 197 
The question is, ifthe second option has this negative effect, 
why did Summers. reject the first possibility without even 
considering it? It is here that the possibility of"taint" emerges. 
Summers assumed that the law schools that are most selective 
in their admissions are also the most demanding in their 
educational standards and are "better" law schools.198 Following 
his analysis, the presence of minority law students at these 
schools is "dangerous" to white law students-the "better" 
students-because their presence pressures the institution to 
work at what Summers perceives to be the lower level of the 
minority students.199 Responses to this pressure will result in 
an inferior education for the more able students. Consequently, 
the presence of African American students is dangerous to 
white students who presumably are able to perform at the 
higher level. 
Special admission programs justify their existence in part on 
the grounds that high institutional standards will not be 
affected. Instead, students admitted according to the "special" 
criteria are cabined off. One educational process is used for 
them; another for students admitted in the "regular" manner. 
Thus, in schools with affirmative action programs, academic 
support programs function to reassure white law school con-
stituencies that the school's standards and norms will remain 
197. Id. at 395-96. 
198. The students in these "better" schools will, he says, have a greater "verbal 
facility and much more highly developed skills in manipulating ideas." Id. at 395. 
Since the class will move at the level of these students, the student who was admitted 
with lower scores will be left behind. Id. 
199. Cf Amana, supra note 152, at 216 ("Under no circumstances should a school 
consider lowering overall academic standards .... ");Carrington, supra note 192, at 
1134-35 (noting that some programs to encourage diversity may, because of the 
admission of less qualified students, result in declines in the quality of teaching and 
research). 
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unpolluted. Although seeming to be a means ofintegrating law 
school classes, these programs ultimately function as a means 
of containing the dangers African Americans may pose, thereby 
maintaining white purity and segregation. 200 
These multiple discourses about African American law 
students both exist within and reinforce the present structure 
of legal education. They do this in two ways. First, the dis-
course of color blindness supports a belief in law school as a 
meritocracy, while the discourse of deviance and danger leaves 
legal academics unsurprised when African American students 
fail. Second, the ideology of color blindness claims that deci-
sions, including curricular decisions, should be made without 
reference to race. If African Americans are assumed to be the 
same as whites, then it is sufficient to discuss only whites in 
the classroom. Nothing would be added by discussing African 
Americans. The result is that legal education has needed to 
change very little to accommodate the presence of African 
Americans.201 The ideology of race-blind equality supports the 
maintenance of the status quo, as does the possibility of 
African American difference and inferiority. Neither of these 
discourses admits the possibility of difference without inferior-
ity. That possibility, discussed in the next Part, would require 
a reassessment of whether legal education is biased against 
African Americans. 
IV. AFRICAN AMERICAN LAW STUDENTS AND DIFFERENCE 
A system of legal education structured around the assump-
tion that African American students are either the same as 
whites or inferior to whites is likely to place any African 
American students who understand themselves as different, 
but not inferior, at a serious disadvantage. For these students, 
200. This is very similar to the role that tracking has played in integrated public 
schools. See, e.g., Jeannie Oakes, Tracking in Mathematics and Science Education: 
A Structural Contribution to Unequal Schooling, in CLASS, RACE, GENDER IN AMERICAN 
EDUCATION 106, 112-19 (Lois Weis ed., 1988) (noting that poor and minority students 
often are placed in remedial classes at an early age, which may result in a limitation 
of those students' opportunities and may contribute to their lower academic outcomes). 
201. See Anthony J. Scanlon, The History and Culture of Affirmative Action, 1988 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 343, 351 (stating that summer support programs of the mid-1960s were 
popular in part because they did not require curricular change). 
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their identities as African Americans202 may conflict with the 
white or inferior identities imposed on them by law schools. 
They may understand that while law and legal education make 
claims to be blind to race, law students-African American and 
white-are taught that race counts in a variety of ways. 
I consider here three characteristics described frequently in 
studies of African American cultures and identity: (1) the 
organic nature of African American communities; (2) a distinct 
oral linguistic tradition; and (3) a sense of alienation from and 
opposition to the dominant white culture. I am not claiming 
that these characteristics have a definitional priority over 
others, 203 but only that these are important to some African 
Americans' sense of self. This Part will show that the structure 
oflegal education particularly disadvantages African American 
law students whose identities are defined in relation to these 
characteristics.204 For these students, legal education presents 
distinct obstacles that are not present for white students with 
different understandings of their own identities.205 In short, it 
202. The culture of law school also may make legal education more difficult for 
others who do not identify themselves with its traditional norms. These may include 
Hispanics, Asian Americans, white women, and poor men and women regardless of 
race. A discussion of the problems faced by these groups, however, is outside of the 
scope of this Article. In order to determine the extent of any bias in legal education 
against people from these groups, it would be necessary to explore the cultures that 
form each of them, similar to the preliminary exploration of African American cultures 
in this section. 
I also want to be clear that I am not claiming that there is a single, monolithic, 
African American culture. Gender, class, geographic area, and national origin, among 
other factors, are all critical to any discussion of African American identities. For 
examples of the ways in which such factors are important, see Walter R. Allen, The 
Color of Success: African-American College Student Outcomes at Predominantly White 
and Historically Black Public Colleges and Universities, 62 HARV. EDUC. REV. 26, 28-32 
(1992) (discussing findings on the relative performances of African Americans in 
college); Signithia Fordham & John U. Ogbu, Black Students' School Success: Coping 
with the "Burden of 'Acting White'», 18 URB. REV. 176, 193-98 (1986) (describing 
gender differences in the ways African American high school students cope with school 
success and the social difficulties it fosters among their peers). I recognize that for 
some African American students, the "white" identity constructed for them by the 
legal academy and their own sense of identity may be sufficiently similar that there 
may not be problems. 
203. See generally RoBERT c. SMITH & RICHARD SELTZER, RACE, Cl.Ass, AND CULTURE: 
A STUDY IN AFRo-AMERICAN MAss OPINION (1992) (discussing African American religion, 
alienation, civic attitudes, and ideology). 
204. This methodology draws on that used by Mary Joe Frug. Frug, supra note 98, 
at 1070-74 (imagining multiple "readers" and their responses to a casebook). 
205. Similarly, Sheila Foster notes that the melting pot ideal requires only some 
people to give up their racially-related identities. Sheila Foster, Difference and 
Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of"Diversity», 1993 WIS. L. REV. 105, 
151. 
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is the goal of this Part to show that legal education is not 
culturally neutral. 
A. Organic Communities 
Understanding African American communities as organic 
means picturing them, as Regina Austin does, as places where 
"everyone would be a resource, especially those whom the 
dominant society would write off as having little or nothing to 
contribute. "206 According to this admittedly idealized vision, 
African American communities draw an important portion of 
their strength and meaning from all of their members; the 
members in turn draw their identity from the community.207 
Many aspects of African American culture contribute to its 
organic nature. Anthony Cook described religious conversion 
in African American communities as providing "a process in 
which personalities disintegrated by the social chaos of op-
pression found meaning and commonality by fusing with others 
in a collective act of self-affirmation and even defiance."208 
Similarly, the call and response form, often used in African 
American religion and music, "embodies an interlocking and 
synergistic dimension, in which members of the group partici-
pate by adding their own voice to those of others, to serve both 
as counterpoint and counterforce ... until collective spiritual 
release and regeneration is achieved. "209 The close, organic 
206. Regina Austin, "The Black Community,» Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of 
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1799 (1992). 
207. Id. at 1775. 
208. Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology 
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985, 1022 (1990) (citation omitted); 
see also CHARI.Es P. HENRY, CULTURE AND AFRICAN AMERICAN PoLITICS 61-75 (1990) (noting 
that many African American faiths believe that Blacks are a chosen people). 
209. THOMAS KocHMAN, BLACK AND WHITE STYLES IN CoNF1JCT 109 (1981). For discus-
sions of the call and response form in African American music, see ROGER D. 
ABRAHAMS, TALKING BLACK 83 (1976); HENRY, supra note 208, at 34 (rap); LAWRENCE W. 
LEVINE, BLACK CULTURE AND BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS 232 (1977) (blues). 
The community's response to a performance often is crucial to African American 
performers, who use it as a way of assessing what their performance has meant to 
the audience. GENEVA SMITHERMAN, TALKIN AND TESTIFYIN: THE LANGUAGE OF BLACK 
AMERICA 110-18 (1977). Reportedly Ethel Waters, who was used to performing before 
African American audiences, thought she had failed before a white audience because: 
"Nobody stomped as they always do in colored theaters when I finish my act. Nobody 
screamed or jumped up and down. Nobody howled with joy." LEVINE, supra, at 233 
(quoting Ethel Waters). 
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nature of many African American communities also is rein-
forced by the frequent use of "brother" and "sister" to refer to 
members of the community.210 
Students whose identities are formed, at least partially, 
through their connection to the African American community 
may feel that law school challenges their very selves. They may 
feel excluded from participating in African American communi-
ty activities, and thus from being African American, by the 
time demands and competitiveness of law school culture. Lois 
Weis notes that academic success for African American stu-
dents, at least in the community college setting which she 
studied, generally means rejecting the community's immediate 
demands for assistance.211 The students she studied understood 
that success in school meant letting go of the street communi-
ty. 212 These community college students found this bearable 
because they intended to use their educations as a means of 
moving away from their communities. 213 
210. See BEIL HOOKS, SlsTERs OF THE YAM: BLACK WOMEN AND SELF-REcOVERY 13 (1993) 
(using "sister" and "yam" to emphasize kinship and community among African 
American women). 
Carol B. Stack's discussion of the support that Black women on welfare provide to 
one another is yet another example of the organic nature of the Black women's 
community. CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN 34-40 (1974); see also Haney-Lopez, supra 
note 124, at 50-53 (discussing the effects of community ties on world perspectives). 
African American communities of course also may have individualistic aspects. See 
S. Rhett Jones, Rugged Black Individualism: Eighteenth Century Causes-Twentieth 
Century Consequences, 1 J. PAN AFR. STUD. 1, 1, 3-7 (1990) (arguing against the 
common perception "that black Americans are a communalistic folk" and asserting 
that black Americans are in fact individualistic and self-reliant as a result of their 
experiences as slaves); see also JAY MACLEOD, AIN'T No MAKIN' IT 141 (1987) (noting that 
African American students and parents often accept the achievement ideology of the 
educational system). Students whose African American identities are tied to the norm 
of achievement may feel less like they are under attack in law school. Nevertheless, 
law schools' structural biases against African American law students-very little 
classroom discussion of African Americans, choice of written work as the major 
evaluative criteria-are likely to work against these students as well. 
211. LOIS WEIS, BETWEEN Two WORLDS 126 (1985). Weis's study shows how the 
community college's attendance policy, for example, was at odds with the fluid under-
standing of time on the street; compliance with the attendance policy would prevent 
meaningful participation in the collective life and obligations of the street. Id. at 
77-82. Yet not all students were required to reject their underclass community in 
order to succeed. Older women who earned associate degrees in secretarial science 
or child care could participate in college while remaining outside of the student 
culture and maintaining their community ties. Furthermore, upon completing their 
Associate of Arts degrees, their wages would be low enough to require them to remain 
within the community. Income from employment in one of those fields would simply 
supplement the resources otherwise available in the kin networks. Id. at 126. 
212. Id. at 17-21. 
213. Id. at 20. 
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In contrast to the students that Weis studied, some African 
American law students may have chosen law school because 
they wish to use their legal skills to assist their communi-
ties. 214 While in law school, they are likely to be physically 
separated from these communities. Students whose identities 
are closely tied to helping their communities may turn to the 
subject matter of their courses for support for their identities. 
These students' reasons for coming to law school likely will be 
undermined by the significant lack of information available in 
most law school curricula on issues that would be important 
to African American communities.215 
James McPherson's description of his class at Harvard Law 
School in the late 1960s illustrates this response: 
It has always bothered me that three very bright black 
students, two from excellent Ivy League colleges and the 
third from one of the best black colleges, flunked out after 
our first year at Harvard. . .. One of the men obviously 
preferred to read literature much more than to read law. 
The other two had a very keen sense of obligation to what 
was called in those days "the civil rights movement." Both 
had been highly active in civil rights affairs before coming 
to law school-in fact, one man came to Harvard directly 
from a Mississippi jail-and both worked in civil liberties 
organizations at the law schooi during that first year .... 
Were these two men looking for some immediate relation-
ship between su,bjects which required most of their time 
and the social situations which they had agreed to leave for 
a while? If one assumes that they sincerely sought rele-
vance, it is possible to see, or at least speculate on, why 
they did not succeed during that first year. The answer 
seems simple: they failed to recognize that the study oflaw 
214. See, e.g., GRANFIELD, supra note 81, at 39 (quoting the son of an African 
American minister, who went to law school so that he could provide legal counsel to 
his father's church); see also David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop?, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 1981 (1993) (arguing that African American law students and lawyers 
owe moral obligations to African American communities). The question of the relation 
of African American intellectuals to African American communities is a long-standing 
issue. For discussions of this issue, see HAROLD CRUSE, THE CRISIS OF THE NEGRO 
INTELLECTUAL (1967); see also Deborah W. Post, Reflections on Identity, Diversity and 
Morality, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 136, 158-64 ( 1990-1991) (discussing the morality 
of Black assimilation into the white culture); Forum: On the Responsibility of 
Intellectuals, BOSTON REV., Jan./Feb. 1993, at 22 (reporting on a transcript from part 
of a forum on the future of the urban poor). 
215. See supra text accompanying notes 94-101. 
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has no immediate relevance to the black community. It is 
almost pure study. The real relevance comes only after the 
period of training . . . ·. 216 
The current substance oflegal education does not provide much 
more sustenance for an African American law student looking 
for discussions of issues of relevance to the African American 
communities than it did in the 1960s. An African American law 
student looking for this type of information will find it only in 
the most hidden nooks and crannies of the core courses.217 A 
white, middle class student, by contrast, will find that most 
courses, most of the time, deal with the communities from 
which he comes and with the business or personal issues of 
relevance to those communities. 
Furthermore, African American students may even experi-
ence difficulty visualizing themselves in the settings or trans-
actions described in class. 
Consider discussions of probable cause where the reason-
ableness of an officer's suspicion requires students to view 
the situation through the eyes of the arresting officer. It is 
not unusual for professors to base a hypothetical on the 
presence of a Black person in a white neighborhood .... 
[T]he minority student is essentially required to look back 
at herself to determine whether her own presence in a 
white neighborhood would· be sufficient cause for her to 
arrest herself. 218 
African American students may find it easier to see them-
selves on the subordinate side, rather than on the dominant 
side, of a transaction between police and suspect, seller and 
purchaser, landlord and tenant, bureaucrat and benefits 
216. McPherson, supra note 99, at 96. Arguing, as McPherson does, that African 
American law students should see law school simply as an interruption in their 
connection to the community-that they will be able to return to it with renewed vigor 
upon graduation-is a recognition of their difference from white students. First, it may 
turn out that law school cannot be merely an "interruption." The amount of time 
African American students spend in law school on white subjects and under the 
assumption that they themselves are just like white law students may affect their 
very identities. African American students who see this as a possibility and wish to 
prevent it will have to work simply to maintain their identities. Second, even ifit were 
true that law school is simply an interruption in African American students' lives, 
white students have no similar period in which their sense of self must be put on hold. 
217. See supra text accompanying notes 94-99. 
218. Crenshaw, supra note 89, at 4 (citations omitted). 
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recipient, corporate tortfeasor and victim. These subordinate 
positions are likely to evoke strong emotions on the part of the 
students. White students, like "objective" white scholars, may 
be able to "remain cool and distant in the face of suffering or 
anger because it is not their liberation, their humanity, which 
is at stake."219 To ask many of the African American students 
to do the same may be to ask them to deny their identities as 
they have been formed in relation to their conceptions of 
African American communities.220 
Not only are some African American students prevented from 
studying the very subjects that are crucial to their sense of who 
they are, but they are forced to study, as if they were white, 
subjects that assume their whiteness. As a result, it seems 
likely that at least some of those African American students 
whose identities are formed in relation to their communities 
will try to maintain or create ties with African American 
communities, either within or outside of the law school.221 This 
is a way ofresisting the law school's effort to make them white. 
African American students often participate in the Black 
American Law Students Association (BALSA) or community 
organizations near the law school, tutor other law students or 
students in the local schools, or become leaders in their 
church.222 Although it is hard to obtain information about 
African American students' activities on behalf of the commu-
nity, African American faculty have not been shy about de-
scribing the frequent conflicts that they experience in trying 
219. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship 
as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2238 (1992). 
220. It is important to recognize that the African American communities with 
which students identify may have mythic as well as real components to them. Regina 
Austin describes the communities' legendary aspects: 
There exists out there, somewhere, "the black community." ... [l]t is more of 
an idea, or an ideal, than a reality .... "The black community" of which I write 
is partly the manifestation of a nostalgic longing for a time when ... concern 
about the welfare of the poor was more natural than our hairdos. 
Austin, supra note 206, at 1769. 
221. This, of course, is not a characteristic that is limited to African American 
students. Others have argued that women's identities are often derived from their 
sense of caring for and responsibility to others. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT 
VOICE: PsYCHOLOGICAL THEoRY AND WOMEN's DEvELoPMENT (1982); Suzanna Sheny, Civic 
Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 
584-90 (1986). 
222. See Espinoza, supra note 125, at 291. 
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to serve the local African American communities while at the 
same time meeting the demands of the law school.223 
Participation in community activities may help African 
American students recover their sense of communal identity 
and self-worth; these endeavors, however, often require pre-
cious hours that otherwise could be spent studying.224 When 
African American students are cautioned not to undertake too 
many extracurricular obligations, they may respond by arguing 
that law school should be kept in perspective-there are "real 
world" problems that require immediate attention. In structur-
ing their lives around these problems, and in downplaying the 
importance of academics, the students establish the fundamen-
tals of a culture ofresistance. This culture may simultaneously 
make it possible for them to survive law school and make such 
survival more difficult. 
The effort to recreate community where there is none also 
may cause some African American law students to identify 
with their African American law school peers in situations in 
which such identification can be dangerous to their own 
academic success. An African American student whose own 
identity is structured by a sense of belonging to a community 
may feel personally injured, discouraged, or angry if another 
African American student does not perform as well as hoped 
in law school.225 The student may experience personal failure 
for not having done more to prevent the friend's troubles. 
223. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Strangers in Academic Paradise: Law Teachers of Color 
in Still White Schools, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 385, 394 (1986) (describing some minority 
law teachers who give up all other duties in favor of working with minority law 
students); Roy L. Brooks, Life After Tenure: Can Minority Law Professors Avoid the 
Clyde Ferguson Syndrome?, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 420-24 (1986) (recognizing the 
various demands made on minority faculty members' time by law students and 
community leaders); Delgado, supra note 101, at 355-56 (noting that a survey found 
that nearly two-thirds of minority law faculty reported feeling acute time pressure, 
often as a result of demands placed on them to counsel minority students, to 
participate in law school committees, or to speak to minority groups). 
224. See Deasy, supra note 9, at 553 n.36 (describing the fears of an African 
American law professor who, after studying the poor performance of African American 
law students, was concerned that these students may be rejecting the goal of 
developing necessary legal skills "in favor of directing their energies toward achieving 
popularity and social success"). 
225. This is an experience that we noted frequently at New England School of Law 
during a period in the 1980s in which a substantial percentage of our African 
American students were academically dismissed each year. The remaining African 
American students, even those who had performed quite well, would be fearful, angry, 
and discouraged, as if they themselves were the ones who had performed poorly. 
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Conversely, African American law students may believe that 
others' success rides on theirs and be overwhelmed by this 
responsibility in a setting in which teachers invariably push 
students to the point where they must admit that they do not 
know the answer. James McPherson poignantly described these 
feelings of shared identity among Black law students, drawing 
from his own experiences in the late 1960s: 
The silence, the heavy sense of expectation, fell on all of the 
blacks in a classroom whenever one of us was called upon 
for an answer. We waited, with the class, for the chosen 
man to justify the right of all of us to be there. And the 
busy silence between the time a black student was called 
on and the time he began to make an answer was alive 
with all our answers being pushed, by sad attempts at 
some kind of empathy, from all sections of the huge room 
to the mind of the man who, for the moment, represented 
all of us .... And when an answer came, however poor it 
was, there would be relief . . . audible in the renewed 
breathing of the rest of the black students. 226 
For African American law students who feel the weight of the 
community on their shoulders every time they speak, the 
stakes are higher than they are for ·students who do not feel 
this way. 
It is not surprising that these students venture fewer vol-
untary answers and generally participate less frequently in 
order to reduce the risks of failing their communities. it also 
is not surprising that they venture fewer answers and partic-
ipate less because the information provided makes less sense 
to them than it does to their white counterparts. If the African 
American students can neither visualize themselves in the 
transactions described nor see the value of the information 
provided for their communities, it will be harder for them to 
learn than for the white students who are familiar with the 
people and events described and with the communities that 
226. McPherson, supra note 99, at 99; see also Margalynne Armstrong, Meditations 
on Being Good, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 43, 43 (1990-1991) (recounting a Black 
woman student's comment to the author, a Black woman, during her first week as a 
law professor: "Girl, you'd better be good"); Emma C. Jordan, Images of Black Women 
in the Legal Academy, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 5 (1990-1991) (portraying Black 
women faculty's sense of shared identity with one of their number who had been 
publicly criticized). 
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value them. Similarly, students who feel the need to divide 
their time between their communities and the law school are 
not likely to do as well because law school makes heavy de-
mands on student time and provides relatively few opportuni-
ties for part-time study. 
B. Oral Linguistic Tradition 
Legal education's emphasis on written work in a heavily 
analytic style also may place some African American students 
at a distinct disadvantage. Recent studies have claimed that 
African American communities often have a strong and dis-
tinctive tradition of oral language that emphasizes narratives 
and poetics.227 Thus, asking African American students to 
transform their use oflanguage from its primarily oral, playful 
style to the written, analytical style of legal education is 
essentially asking these students to change their identities. 
Henry Louis Gates, in his pathbreaking work, The Signifying 
Monkey, asserts that it is the African American rhetorical 
tradition that distinguishes African American culture from 
white culture.228 This tradition includes the telling and retell-
ing of numerous folktales,229 the language of song,230 the 
strategic use of emotional force,231 and the practice of signify-
ing.232 The emphasis and skill in signifying is on style-the use 
227. ABRAHAMS, supra note 209, at 36; HENRY L. GATES, JR., THE SIGNIFYING MON-
KEY: A THEORY OF AF'RO-AMER.ICAN LITERARY CRrrlCISM (1988); KocHMAN, supra note 209; 
SMITHERMAN, supra note 209, at 77; Paul H. Lorenz, Cultural Rhetorics I Legal 
Rhetoric: Teaching Appropriate Strategies for Legal Discourse, 16 T. MARsHALL L. REV. 
623, 630-31 (1991); Kellis E. Parker, Ideas, Affirmative Action and the Ideal Universi-
ty, 10 NOVA L. REV. 761, 776 (1986); cf RoBERT B. STEPI'O, FRoM BEHIND THE VEIL (1979) 
(arguing that African Americans have a long tradition of written narratives). 
228. GATES, supra note 227, at 45; see also Lorenz, supra note 227, at 628-29 
(discussing the need for African Americans to learn a new language in order to 
"'com[e] to terms' with the dominant culture"). 
229. See, e.g., RoGER D. ABRAHAMS, DEEP DOWN IN THE JUNGLE (1970) (a study of 
modern urban folklore); BooK OF NEGRO FOLKLORE (Langston Hughes & Arna Bontemps 
eds., 1958) (a collection of traditional folktales); BRUCE JACKSON, "GET YOUR Ass IN THE 
WATER AND SWIM LIKE ME" (1974) (a study and collection of narrative poetry). 
230. See, ·e.g., LEVINE, supra note 209, at 158-297 (discussing the importance of 
song to Black slave and free communities). 
231. See KOCHMAN, supra note 209, at 108-16. 
232. To signify is to "engage in certain rhetorical games .... " GATES, supra note 
227, at 48. African American folksongs often conveyed meaning indirectly, LEVINE, 
supra note 209, at 242-46, 320-44, while much African American humor allowed 
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of words and phrases with dexterity.233 As Gates says, "one 
does not signify something; one signifies in some way ."234 
The power and elegance of signifying come from the reuse of 
familiar words that carry with them their past meanings. The 
power of the words comes from their sound-for example, 
rhyming is important-as well as from the multiple meanings 
that the words carry.235 In this way it is diametrically opposed 
to the analytic style of legal writing in which meaning is 
circumscribed and limited. According to Gates, the African 
American tradition of signifying orally thus marks "its sense 
of difference from the rest of the English community of speak-
ers."236 For those African Americans who are in this tradition, 
the oral heritage and the practice of signifying define their 
identities: "The mastery ofSignifyin[g] creates homo rhetoricus 
African us ."237 
Students whose linguistic patterns and identities have been 
formed by this African American oral tradition may find 
themselves at a particular disadvantage in law school. To the 
student who is schooled in the oral tradition, law school's 
emphasis on a particular form of written work may appear 
hostile. Legal writing puts a premium on the concise, analytical 
use of words. 238 Extraneous words are discouraged, in part 
African American people to be simultaneously actors and observers of themselves. 
Spirituals often referred simultaneously to a world after death and to the trials of 
slavery and the hopes and plans for escape. DANIEL KINGMAN, AMERICAN MUSIC: A 
PANORAMA 38-39 (1979). 
233. Claudia Mitchell-Kernan gives an example of the practice of signifying. She 
describes an incident in which Grace, who had four children, was unhappy to discover 
herself to be pregnant again. One day, after Grace's pregnancy had begun to show, 
but before Grace had announced her pregnancy, her sister Rochelle came to visit her. 
Mitchell-Kernan describes the following conversation as an example of signifying: 
Rochelle: Girl, you sure do need to join the Metrecal for lunch bunch. 
Grace: (non-committally) Yea, I guess I am putting on a little weight. 
Rochelle: Now look here, girl, we both standing here soaking wet and you still 
trying to tell me it ain't raining. 
Claudia Mitchell-Kernan, Signifying, in MOTHER WIT FROM THE LAUGHING BARREL 310, 
318-19 (Alan Dundes ed., 1973). 
234. GATES, supra note 227, at 54. 
235. An example of this multiplicity of meanings is the term "to signify" itself. This 
term empties the word of its standard (white) content, which is "to mean," but does 
not substitute its opposite. In thus declaring its difference from standard (white) 
usage, the term itself now signifies. GATES, supra note 227, at 46-47. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 75. 
238. See Lawrence, supra note 219, at 2278-79 (contrasting legal writing style with 
the Black tradition of storytelling). 
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because they have the potential for conveying multiple, unex-
plored meanings. Students rarely are encouraged to develop. 
their own style. 239 In fact, style is relatively unimportant; it can 
come later. Instead, students are expected to parse their cases 
to identify the legal facts and rules that relate to the particular 
narrow issue before them. 
The African American oral tradition, in contrast, glories in 
exactly those aspects oflanguage that the legal style excludes: 
emotion, exaggeration, double entendre, and a whole range of 
tropes. 24° For a student who has found her voice within the oral 
tradition, the requirements oflegal writing will be tantamount 
to writing in a different voice. This is consistent with Gates's 
claim that the African American oral tradition is a signifying 
mark of difference between African American and white 
communities. 241 
The importance of this mark cannot be overstated.242 If some 
African American students begin law school with a specific 
style of communicating that for them is tied to their identities 
as African Americans, and if law school requires a drastically 
different style of communication that is identical to the style 
already possessed by some white students, it should not be 
surprising that law faculties often find that these African 
American students have trouble with legal writing. Further-
more, if the student's style of communication is an integral 
part of the student's identity as an African American, then 
changing that student's writing style will require a change in 
the student's self. The student may perceive the process of 
learning to write like a lawyer as simultaneously forcing the 
student to become white.243 
239. See CHARLES R CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND WRITING 71-72 (1990); GERTRUDE 
BLOCK, EFFECTIVE LEGAL WRITING 29-31 (3d ed. 1986). 
240. See GATES, supra note 227, at 44-51. 
241. Id. at 46-47. 
242. It may, for example, help to explain the plagiarism of which Martin Luther 
King, Jr. has been accused. For discussions of this, see KEITH D. MILLER, VOICE OF 
DELIVERANCE: THE LANGUAGE OF MARTIN L. KING., JR. AND ITS SoURCES (1992); Clayborne 
Carson et al., Martin Luther King, Jr., as Scholar: A Reexamination of His Theological 
Writings, 78 J. AM. HIST. 93 (1991); David J. Garrow, King's Plagiarism: Imitation, 
Insecurity, and Transformation, 78 J. AM. HIST. 86 (1991); Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Papers Project, The Student Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr.: A Summary Statement 
on Research, 78 J. AM. HIST. 23 (1991); Keith D. Miller, Martin Luther King, Jr., and 
the Black Folk Pulpit, 78 J. AM. HIST. 120 (1991). 
243. CARTER, supra note 27, at 26 (noting a student complaint that in order to be 
invited to join the law review, African American students must learn to write like 
white males); see also Signithia Fordham, Racelessness as a Factor in Black Students' 
School Success: Pragmatic Strategy or Pyrrhic Victory?, 58 HARV. EDUC. REV. 54 (1988) 
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Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that learning 
to write like a lawyer may be a particularly complicated and 
painful process for some African American students. For these 
students, legal education and legal writing are not simply a 
matter of acquiring new skills, they are a matter of acquiring 
a new racial identity. Law school faculties' failure to acknow-
ledge the particular obstacles placed in front of African Ameri-
can students whose identities are formed by an oral culture 
makes it more difficult for them to teach these African 
American students to write successfully. In this setting, the 
claim that African American and white law students are 
essentially the same is not only wrong, but also may contribute 
to the creation of writing standards that place significant burd-
ens on African American students while easing white students' 
way. 
Similarly, the choice to evaluate students almost entirely 
through their written work may operate to the benefit of white 
students and to the disadvantage of African American stu-
dents. Not only do some African American writing styles differ 
significantly from the acceptable legal style, but skill areas in 
which these same students might have an advantage over 
white students are not examined. The African American oral 
style described above, because of the multiplicity of meanings 
that a listener can take from a statement, can be persuasive 
in both African American and white communities. For example, 
by using portions from texts that make up white America's 
history-patriotic songs, philosophical tracts, or religious 
pieces-Martin Luther King, Jr., was able to present a "pas-
tiche"244 that moved African Americans and simultaneously 
sounded familiar and powerful, but not threatening, to many 
white Americans.245 Certainly, it is useful for lawyers of any 
race to have this ability to persuade in their repertoire. The 
(arguing that African American students who succeed in school often utilize a strategy 
ofrejecting their racial identity and adopting one of"racelessness"); Fordham & Ogbu, 
supra note 202, at 182 (noting that the culture of African American school children 
defines as "white" certain activities, including the mastering of the standard academic 
skills). 
244. GATES, supra note 227, at xxvi-xxvii (using the term "pastiche" to describe 
a form of signifying that is a "joyous proclamation of antecedent ... texts"). 
245. See MILLER, supra note 242, at 11-12 (attributing King's success at mobilizing 
middle America in part to his use of the idiom of white preachers); Carson et al., supra 
note 242, at 102-03 (recognizing the role that King's appropriation of others' words 
may have played in mobilizing white Americans); Miller, supra note 242, at 121-23 
(describing the multiple meanings of King's speeches). 
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exclusion of this dynamic oral style biases legal education 
against students whose senses of self are tied to this particular 
oral tradition and in favor of those who identify with and are 
skilled in the white, middle class tradition of the analytic 
written word. 
C. Alienation 
A third cultural characteristic that distinguishes some 
African Americans from white Americans is the former's 
alienation from the dominant American culture.246 More than 
seventy years ago, W.E.B. Du Bois recognized the role this 
feeling of alienation played in the formation of African Amer-
ican identities: 
[T]he Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and 
gifted with second-sight in this American world,-a world 
which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets 
him see himself through the revelation of the other world. 
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this 
sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of 
others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that 
looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his 
two-ness,-an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, 
two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark 
body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn 
asunder.247 
Studies show that the theme of alienation from white society 
and resulting mistrust of that society resonates in many 
246. RoY L. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM 40-41 (1990); SMITH 
& SELTZER, supra note 203, at 142 (identifying the sense of alienation as a trait that 
cuts across class lines among African Americans and distinguishes African American 
culture in the United States); Cheryl I. Harris, Law Professors of Color and the 
Academy: Of Poets and Kings, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331 (1992) (discussing the 
alienation African American law professors experience); Donald K. Hill, Linguistic 
Thought and Behavior: Sociolinguistic Considerations in Multicultural Legal 
Education, 16 T. MARsHALL L. REV. 571, 579 (1991) (arguing that African American 
linguistic thought works to alienate African Americans in American society). 
24 7. W.E.B. Du BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 8-9 (Vintage Books 1986) (1903); 
see also Lawrence, supra note 219, at 2239, 2270-77 (describing the importance of this 
feeling of alienation in African American writers' work). 
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aspects of African American culture.248 Martin Luther King, Jr., 
exhibited a feeling of alienation in accusing ,white America of 
having "given the Negro a bad check; it has come back marked 
'insufficient funds.' "249 African-American folklore always has 
exalted tricksters like Brer Rabbit,250 while a major theme of 
blues music is that others are not to be trusted.251 This sense 
of alienation also affects African Americans' perceptions of the 
educational process. John Ogbu has characterized the relation-
ship between minorities and the public schools as one of 
"conflict and distrust."252 Similarly, Lois Weis interviewed 
African American community college students who believed 
that they were being intentionally cheated out of a first-rate 
education. 253 
248. See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 246, at 40-41 (describing the sense of alienatiOn 
among the African-American middle class); SMITH & SELTZER, supra note 203, at 121-22 
(describing anthropological studies suggesting that African-American interpersonal 
alienation may be more than a class phenomenon, and speculating that it is a cultural 
phenomenon); Hill, supra note 246, at 580 ("Black people, consciously and uncon-
sciously, are forced by political tradition to live in terror of possible sanctions that can 
be exercised against them collectively should the Nation decide not to honor its 
commitment to racial coexistence."). 
249. SMITH & SELTZER, supra note 203, at 121. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. (citing as an example B.B. King's 1970s song entitled "Nobody Loves Me 
But My Mother (And She Could Be Jivin' Too)"). African-American alienation is 
usually described as aimed at white society, but this need not be the case. Smith and 
Seltzer observe that in everyday African-American conversation the poor position of 
many African Americans is often explained by phrases like "Blacks don't stick 
together" or "Niggers don't trust each other." Id. at 122. Note that this type of 
alienation from African-American culture as well as from white would undermine the 
idealized conception of a true African-American community. 
252. John U. Ogbu, Variability in Minority School Performance: A Problem in 
Search of an Explanation, 18 ANTHROPOLOGY & EDUC. Q. 312, 332 (1987). 
253. WEIS, supra note 211, at 139. Weis quotes a student: 
I figure that what they did was put the school right in our community-they said 
"we'll give them this and this may satisfy them." ... [W]e were shortchanged 
as far as the education itself was concerned . 
. . . We're definitely cheated. I think what they're doing is "let's give the 
blacks a place in their own neighborhood, then we can give them as little as 
possible and maybe they'll be satisfied with it .... We'll give them as much as 
we can and they'll keep their mouths shut." 
Id. Similarly, at the New England School of Law in the late 1980s, African American 
students charged that they were being cheated out of exam grades owed to them. They 
believed that faculty were breaking the blind grading codes on exams and singling 
out African American students for low grades. The students believed this although 
they had no evidence other than the low grades. Their complaints expressed the high 
level of alienation they were experiencing. 
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African American law students whose identities are formed 
in opposition to white culture are also at a disadvantage in law 
school. African American law students who experience feelings 
of alienation are likely to be estranged from and distrustful of 
their predominantly white faculty and colleagues. 254 They may 
not be able to participate in class without constantly looking 
for the hidden ways in which faculty and other students are 
manipulating them. For example, some African American 
students may perceive that having once made a particular 
point in reference to relations between Blacks and whites, they 
are now repeatedly called upon to restate the same theme. 255 
As a result, they may feel maneuvered into expressing a point 
over and over again which they believed was true in the setting 
in which they first articulated it, but which is not unambigu-
ously the case in settings in which they are later called upon 
to reproduce it. 
In addition, being called upon repeatedly to restate the same 
point about race may be alienating to an African American 
student who may understand such a procedure as emphasizing 
that she is the only one, or one of very few who, because of 
race, holds a particular substantive position. The student may 
feel reduced to a caricatured racial position for the benefit of 
the surrounding whites. A student who is alienated and 
perceives the world as described above may well decide to be 
silent in the future-that is, to venture no more views that 
would allow a complex identity to be whittled down to a white 
teacher's view of race. 
254. Although most law students, regardless of their race, feel a certain level of 
alienation from law school, this is likely to be more acute and have clear racial 
overtones for African American students, perhaps particularly for African American 
women, who are already distrustful of the dominant white culture. See Armstrong, 
supra note 226, at 44 n.2 (stating that women of color at predominantly white law 
schools claim never to volunteer in class at higher rates than white women); see also 
Montoya, supra note 88, at 9-17 (describing the Anglo "mask" she wore in law school 
to guard against the disclosure of her Latina selO. For a study of women's alienation, 
see Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League 
Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 67-71 (1994) (describing the connection between 
women's feelings of alienation in law school and their comparatively poorer perfor-
mances), and Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty 
Women, 40 STAN L. REV. 1299 (1988) (claiming alienation as a salient characteristic 
of women's relation to law school). 
255. Frances L. Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 79 CAL. 
L. REV. 1512, 1584 (1991) (describing an African American student's anger and 
resentment at repeatedly being forced into service in class as "Mr. Equal Protection"); 
Angela D. Gilmore, It ls Better to Speak, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 74, 75 (1990-1991) 
(recalling feelings of discomfort when issues surrounding race were discussed in class). 
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African American students who feel alienated from the white 
culture around them may believe themselves to be slighted 
when they are not called upon to participate in classroom 
discussions. 256 They may assume the professor considers them 
to be unprepared for class or, worse yet, incapable of doing the 
work.257 Their feelings of alienation may make them suspect 
the worst of their professors. 258 
These African American students also may be less willing to 
seek out white faculty informally for assistance or discussions 
because they may fear the extreme inequality that often results 
from Black-white informal relations.259 The color-blind assump-
tion that permeates legal education may mean that legal 
educators do not even notice their lack of academic interchange 
with some African American students. Generally it is thought 
to be up to the students to initiate contact with the faculty; 
usually it is assumed that there is no structural barrier to any 
particular group of students taking advantage of the faculty's 
presence.260 African American law students, however, may 
choose not to engage with faculty because such interactions 
may have different meanings for those students than they 
would for white students. 
It also is possible that for some African American students, 
alienation affects not only how they interact in class, but also 
how they understand the doctrines that they are taught. 
Donald Hill has claimed, for example, that some African 
American law students resist the fact that oral contracts are 
enforceable because of their distrust of the law as a white 
ins ti tu ti on. 
Black students resist the notion of oral contracts. They are 
overly dependent on the sanctity of its written form .... 
Black students equally resist the full acceptance of other 
256. Ansley, supra note 255, at 1584 (describing an African American student 
taking offense at not being called on more frequently). 
257. Id. 
258. Of course, it is also entirely possible that the professor was worried about the 
students' ability to perform and thought that the best way not to "embarrass" them 
was simply not to call on them. See Lawrence, supra note 60, at 328-44 (describing 
white liberal unconscious racism). 
259. Patricia Williams characterizes these relationships as "stranger-chattel" 
relationships. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 148 (1991). 
260. But see Guinier et al., supra note 254, at 71-75 (describing barriers to female 
student interaction with faculty outside of class despite "equal" faculty treatment of 
male and female students). 
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contractual doctrines which are heavily weighted toward 
such interpersonal dependencies, as good faith, reliance, 
estoppel, custom and usage, course of dealing, etc ... . 
[They also are inclined] to seek extreme safe guards, .. . 
to cover every contingency in the negotiating and drafting 
stages where reliance upon the verbal expressions of intent 
are involved.261 
This is consistent with Patricia Williams's story about her 
approach to renting an apartment. She and a white male 
friend, Peter Gabel, went apartment hunting in New York City 
at the same time. When Gabel found an apartment, he gave 
the lessor a cash deposit without signing a lease or obtaining 
keys or receipt in exchange. Williams, in contrast, upon finding 
an apartment in a building owned by a friend, signed a lease 
that was first negotiated in detail. She noted that both she and 
Gabel were seeking to establish relationships of trust with 
their landlords, but that their senses of how to establish trust 
were very different: 
Peter, for example, appeared to be extremely self-conscious 
of his power potential (either real or imagistic) as a white 
or male or lawyer authority figure .... 
On the other hand, I was raised to be acutely conscious 
of the likelihood that no matter what degree of profession-
al I am, people will greet and dismiss my black femaleness 
as unreliable, untrustworthy, hostile, angry, powerless, 
irrational, and probably destitute. . . . As black, I have 
been given by this society a strong sense of myself as 
already too familiar, personal, subordinate to white peo-
ple. I am still evolving from being treated as three-fifths of 
a human, a subpart of the white estate. I grew up in a 
neighborhood where landlords would not sign leases with 
their poor black tenants, and demanded that rent be paid 
in cash; ... such informality in most white-on-black situa-
tions signals distrust, not trust. Unlike Peter, I am still 
engaged in a struggle to set up transactions at arm's 
length, as legitimately commercial, and to portray myself 
261. Hill, supra note 246, at 585-86; see Guinier et al., supra note 254, at 72-77 
(noting social science findings that members of minority groups often perceive 
informality as contrary to their interests). 
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as a bargainer of separate worth, distinct power, sufficient 
rights to manipulate commerce . 
. . . For me, stranger-stranger relations are better than 
stranger-chattel. 262 
Law school does not take into account how an African 
American student's sense of estrangement from white society 
may affect her understanding of some legal subjects. Many 
legal doctrines are premised on the idea that informally made 
commitments should be enforceable.263 Legal education as-
sumes that this will be an equally acceptable concept to all 
students. The possibility that some students may be culturally 
positioned against believing in the enforceability of specific 
types of commitments is simply not considered. Nor does legal 
education take into account that these students may have 
repeatedly experienced the unenforceability in practice of 
informal commitments or that to African American students 
such informal commitments may signal inequality instead of 
equality. The cultural stance stems from and is reinforced by 
the events of daily life. It should not be surprising that, under 
such circumstances, it will be harder for these African Ameri-
can law students to believe what they are being taught than 
for white students whose experiences reinforce the plausibility 
and naturalness of the topics they are learning. 
My point here is not to set out exhaustively all the relevant 
ways in which African American law students may differ from 
white ones. Rather, it is to show that for at least some stu-
dents, such cultural differences do exist and undoubtedly will 
be important in structuring the student's identity. These 
students will not understand themselves to be the same as 
white students, nor will they understand themselves as infe-
rior. The process and content oflegal education, however, are 
premised on the truth of one or the other of these two as-
sumptions. For at least some African American law students, 
legal education presents challenges to who they are and how 
they know things that it never poses to many of the white 
students. 
262. WILLIAMS, supra note 259, at 147-48. 
263. An example is the constellation of estoppel and reliance-based concepts that 
permeate tort, contracts, and property law where one party is considered to be 
entitled to rely on the other even in the absence of a written contract. See Ronald 
Chester & Scott E. Alumbaugh, Functionalizing First-Year Legal Education: Toward 
a New Pedagogical Jurisprudence, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 65-70 (1991). 
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CONCLUSION 
Legal education describes African American law students as 
the same as whites, while simultaneously portraying them as 
different from and inferior to whites. What it does not recog-
nize is the possibility of difference without subordination. As 
shown in Part IV, some African Americans will understand 
themselves as being different in ways that are important to 
their identities but are not marks of inferiority. For these 
students, legal education's promise to treat white and African 
American students the same is an empty shell: legal educa-
tion actually places obstacles in the way of some African 
Americans, obstacles that are absent for whites. 
How can it be, in a legal environment permeated with the 
ideology of color blindness, that legal education is blind to its 
own white structure? One answer is that the ideology of racial 
neutrality contains within it the seeds of its own preferences. 
The ideology of racial neutrality emphasizes that decisions 
about the course of a person's life are not predetermined by 
that person's race. Instead, individual choices set the direction 
for one's life. The result is that African American students' 
failures to excel are recast as the result of particular choices 
that they have made, not as the result of structural obstacles 
in front of them as African Americans.264 
African American students are blamed for their own failures 
in ways that are very clear. The skills-based discourse of 
academic support programs accuses them of not having devel-
oped sufficiently the necessary faculties of legal analysis and 
legal writing. This accusation is consistent with a race-neutral 
approach to these students because it presumes that they 
have the same opportunities as white students to develop 
these talents. This may be the case for some African American 
law students, but for others who have distinct and different 
African American identities, it will not be. Their attachment 
to African American communities, their oral tradition of 
signifying, and their alienation from the white society of the 
faculty and their fellow students will affect their ability to 
master particular skills. 
264. This understanding is consistent with the legal system's emphasis on 
individual choice within the ideology of color blindness. See supra text accompanying 
notes 41-59 (discussing City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989)). 
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Within the color-blind world of legal education, however, 
their failings are not seen as due to the interaction between 
their racial identities and a white-oriented system of legal 
education. Instead, their failings are understood as being the 
African American students' faults. Thus, they are seen as 
choosing to engage in community activities instead of spend-
ing the time studying, choosing inept study groups composed 
of other African American students, choosing to complain and 
to be alienated instead of focusing on academic work, and 
choosing to write in an insufficiently analytical fashion. 
I do not want to argue that these are not choices. They are, 
of course, but "choice" is a slippery word. Part of what is im-
plied by the use of the word "choice" is that the meaning of 
the choices is the same for these African American students 
as it would be for white students. White students' racial 
identities, however, are not likely to be challenged when they 
make the systemically desired decisions. Their identity as 
whites is much less likely to be implicated in their connec-
tions to specific communities inside and outside of the law 
school, to the level of their involvement in the activities-in 
class and extracurricular--of the law schqol, or to their par-
ticular style of communicating with others. 
The decisions that African American law students must make 
are understood within the culture of legal education as fore-
gone in favor of study time, not community time, acquiescence 
as opposed to opposition, and a willingness to write in the 
required style. When some African American students make 
the opposite choices because of their own racial identities, legal 
educators do not understand what is at stake for them. This 
is because the connection between the choices and racial 
identities is not understood. Instead, race is seen as irrelevant 
to how one organizes oneself in relation to law school. What 
may be major issues of identity for some African American law 
students are seen as frivolous, lazy, or inept decisions by the 
color-blind culture of legal education. The result is that the 
message of racial irrelevance can be maintained despite 
disproportionately low performances by African American 
students. 
This stance-that the individual African American student 
is at fault-makes it unnecessary to challenge the status quo 
of legal education. If an African American's failure to perform 
as well as white students is due to the African American 
student's individual choices, then that failure cannot be laid 
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at the door oflegal education. Law faculty need not reexamine 
the content of their own individual courses nor, as a group, 
need they restructure the curriculum. 
For example, they need not reconsider the decision to eval-
uate student progress almost entirely through written work. 265 
Although writing is undoubtedly an important part of what any 
lawyer does, it is by no means the only way in which lawyers 
communicate. One recent study of lawyering skills repeatedly 
ranks oral communication as the most important skill, placing 
it above written communication regardless of practice set-
ting. 266 In a world in which oral communication is so important 
to lawyers, it is anomalous that it is given such short shift in 
law school. One might argue that this is because it is difficult 
to evaluate a person's oral skills in a large class. But it is not 
clear that evaluating short oral exams would take any longer 
than reading the multi-hour written exams that are common 
today. Furthermore, many schools have established writing 
requirements for graduation that involve individualized faculty 
supervision of long written projects. The resources used to 
evaluate these long written projects could have been devoted 
to evaluation of oral skills. 
The assertion that African American law students are the 
same as white students places the fault on African American 
students when they do not succeed. It also makes it unneces-
sary to review the structure and content of legal education. 
Finally, it reinforces the concept of a unitary legal profession. 
Paul Carrington argues that for the legal profession to be one 
single profession, "there needs to be an acknowledged common 
. core of shared public values informing the professional work 
265. The overwhelming majority of a student's credit hours are evaluated through 
written projects. Occasionally these will be research papers or take-home exams, but 
most commonly they will be traditional blue book exams. Kissam, supra note 90, at 
437-38; Nickles, supra note 90, at 431-31; see Motley, supra note 90, at 753 (stating 
that much of law students' work product consists of exams). 
266. Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the Construction of 
Competence, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469 (1993). This study indicates that young Chicago 
lawyers, lawyers from rural and medium sized cities in Missouri, and Chicago hiring 
partners all ranked oral communication as more important than written communica-
tion, although in some cases the rankings were quite close. Id. at 473, 477. Similarly, 
lawyers practicing for the government or a corporation gave priority to oral communi-
cation, while lawyers in private practice voted for written communication over oral 
by only the slimmest of margins (written communication received a ranking of 1.19 
on an "importance" scale and oral communication received a 1.20, with one being the 
highest rating available and five being the lowest). Id. at 4 75. 
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of its members."267 Recognizing that African American law 
students are not necessarily the same as white students, that 
they may differ in important ways, would jeopardize the ideal 
ofa unified profession. Lawyers, according to Carrington, must 
be able to make "professional judgments that would coincide 
with those of other [legal] professionals."268 Recognition of 
African Americans' differences might require us to rework our 
conception of law as a profession. 
Thus, the construction of African American law students as 
the same as white ones does not exist in a vacuum. It is 
supported by, and supports, our current system of legal edu-
cation and our larger ideas about the nature of the legal 
profession. Until we are willing to question seriously the 
subject matter and evaluative techniques of legal education 
and its relationship to larger communities-ethnic or profes-
sional-we should not be surprised that a significant and 
disproportionate number of African American law students 
perform unsatisfactorily in law schools. 
267. Carrington, supra note 91, at 505. 
268. Id. at 506. 
